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Abstract
The optimal coalition structure determination problem is in general computationally hard.
In this article, we identify some problem instances for which the space of possible coalition
structures has a certain form and constructively prove that the problem is polynomial time
solvable. Specifically, we consider games with an ordering over the players and introduce
a distance metric for measuring the distance between any two structures. In terms of this
metric, we define the property of monotonicity, meaning that coalition structures closer to
the optimal, as measured by the metric, have higher value than those further away. Similarly,
quasi-monotonicity means that part of the space of coalition structures is monotonic, while
part of it is non-monotonic. (Quasi)-monotonicity is a property that can be satisfied by
coalition games in characteristic function form and also those in partition function form. For
a setting with a monotonic value function and a known player ordering, we prove that the
optimal coalition structure determination problem is polynomial time solvable and devise
such an algorithm using a greedy approach. We extend this algorithm to quasi-monotonic
value functions and demonstrate how its time complexity improves from exponential to
polynomial as the degree of monotonicity of the value function increases. We go further and
consider a setting in which the value function is monotonic and an ordering over the players is
known to exist but ordering itself is unknown. For this setting too, we prove that the coalition
structure determination problem is polynomial time solvable and devise such an algorithm.
Keywords Coalition formation · Cooperative game · Characteristic function game ·
Partition function game · Optimal coalition structure
1 Introduction
One of the fundamental problems in multiagent systems and in game theory is that of deter-
mining an optimal coalition structure, i.e., a partition of a set of n agents into disjoint coalitions
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so as to optimize the value of the partition. The value of a partition is specified in terms of the
values of its constituent coalitions. The value of a coalition, in turn, may be defined in several
ways [30]. One possibility is to define the value of a coalition solely in terms of its members.
In cooperative game theory, such scenarios are called characteristic function games (CFGs)
[7]. In the computer science literature, the corresponding optimal coalition structure deter-
mination problem is referred to as the complete set partitioning problem [22]. Alternatively,
the value of a coalition can be defined in terms of the entire partition in which the coalition
is embedded. In cooperative game theory, such scenarios are referred to as partition function
games (PFGs) [40].
The general problem of optimal coalition structure determination involves combinatorial
search over a space whose size is exponential in the number of agents, which renders brute
force search approach computationally infeasible. In practice though, the search space is not
always unstructured—often there is some form of inherent regularity in at least a part of,
if not the whole space. For example, consider the airline crew scheduling problem, which
requires organising staff into coalitions based on individual characteristics, and optimally
scheduling the coalitions. The players, i.e., the crew, are ordered in that any non-optimal
placement of an individual in the early part of a schedule can propagate down the chain and
reduce the value of the entire partition. It is entirely possible that the earlier in the schedule
a non-optimality is introduced, the greater the reduction in the value of the partition as a
whole, relative to the optimum (see Sect. 8 for details). In other words, the search space is
structured in that there is a relation between the degree of closeness between a partition and
the optimum, and the value of that partition. The greater the closeness, the higher the value.
The aim of our research is to find an effective way of expressing such regularities, in order
to facilitate the development of computationally feasible methods for computing an optimal
coalition structure.
To this end, we consider games with a player ordering and introduce a distance metric
for measuring how close any two partitions are. In terms of this metric, we define a property
of value functions that we refer to as monotonicity. Intuitively, monotonicity means that
coalition structures that are closer to the optimum (when measured using the distance metric)
have higher value than those further away. We also consider quasi-monotonicity. A function
v is quasi-monotonic if it is monotonic for a part of the space but non-monotonic for the
remaining space. This latter property can be satisfied by any kind of value function (i.e., non-
separable,1 CFGs, and PFGs). The degree of monotonicity, (equivalently non-monotonicity),
of a value function is measured in terms of the diameter of the set of all optimal partitions.
The diameter ranges between 0 and 1; at one extreme the diameter is 0 when the value
function is monotonic over the entire search space. As the diameter increases, that part of
the search space for which the value function is monotonic successively decreases in size
while the remaining part for which the value function is non-monotonic increases, reaching
the other extreme at diameter equal to 1, when the value function is non-monotonic over the
entire search space.
Against this background, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. Introducing a metric to measure the distance between any two partitions and defining the
property of monotonicity.
2. For monotonic value functions and a known player ordering, proving that the optimal
coalition structure determination problem is polynomial time solvable and devising such
an algorithm using a greedy approach.
1 Non-separable value functions are more general versions of the value functions employed in the literature
on CFGs and PFGs. See Sect. 2 for details.
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3. Extending the above mentioned greedy algorithm to allow quasi-monotonic functions
and demonstrating how its time complexity improves from exponential to polynomial as
the degree of monotonicity of the value function increases.
4. For monotonic value functions and an unknown player ordering, proving that the optimal
coalition structure determination problem is polynomial time solvable and devising such
an algorithm.
Placing our contribution in the context of existing literature, we note that a great deal
of research has been devoted to the coalition structure generation problem, but most of it
has focused on the complete set partitioning problem, with even the best solutions having
exponential time complexity. As for PFGs, the search space is considerably larger relative to
CFGs. Some recent literature has dealt with restricted cases of PFGs: in [28] either positive
only or negative only externalities are allowed but not both, while in [3] mixed externalities are
considered but only for one specific value function. In other research [37], the computational
complexity is overcome by imposing restrictions on the size of coalitions that can form.
Section 9 provides a detailed account of related literature. Our research advances the state
of art in that we introduce a distance metric and the property of monotonicity which can be
satisfied by three different types of search spaces: CFGs, PFGs (with positive only, negative
only, and mixed externalities), and non-separable value functions. CFGs and PFGs provide a
general prototype for modelling a number of combinatorial optimization problems [9]. The
proposed framework preserves this generality; both the distance metric and the property of
monotonicity are abstract notions which can be used to capture application specific features.
In particular, the key distinctive features of the proposed methods are:
1. Unlike existing methods, they are suitable for any kind of value function (i.e., non-
separable, CFGs, and PFGs with positive only, negative only, and mixed externalities)
that satisfies monotonicity.
2. Unlike existing methods, they require only an ordering on the values of partitions to be
known but not their actual values. The methods in literature require the actual value of
each coalition to be known, and assume that the value function is separable in that the
value of each partition is simply the sum of the values of the coalitions in it. The proposed
methods are therefore practically more relevant because it is easier to know an ordering
over the values of partitions but much harder to know their exact values, especially for
large games.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. We start in Sect. 2 by presenting
notation and defining notions related to coalition structures. Section 3 introduces the distance
metric. We then present algorithms for computing optimal coalition structures for three
different settings:
– Section 4 considers a setting with a monotonic value function, a known player ordering,
and a unique optimum.
– Section 5 considers a setting with a monotonic value function, a known player ordering,
and multiple optima.
– Section 6 considers a setting with quasi-monotonic values and multiple optima.
– Section 7 considers a setting with a monotonic value function, an unknown player order-
ing, and a unique optimum.
Section 8 is a discussion of some applications of the proposed methods. Section 9 places this
research in the context of related literature and Sect. 10 is the concluding section. Table 1 is
summary of notation.
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Table 1 A summary of notation
N = {1, . . . , n} The set of players
C A coalition of players, i.e., C ⊆ N
[i] The set {1, . . . , i}
π A coalition structure over the set N
β iπ The index of the coalition in π to which player i belongs
π|[i] The restriction of π to [i], i.e., the coalition structure
(C1 ∩ [i], C2 ∩ [i], . . .) where π = (C1, C2, . . .)
πC The contraction of π to C , i.e., the coalition structure
(C1 − C, C2 − C, . . .) where π = (C1, C2, . . .)
ΠN The set of all coalition structures over N
πG = {{N }} The coalition structure comprised of the single grand coalition
π S = ∪
i∈N{{i}} The coalition structure comprised of all singletons
Pi Player with priority i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
2 Themodel
We assume a finite, non-empty set of players N = {1, . . . , n}. A coalition, C , is simply a
subset of N , i.e., C ⊆ N . We will denote the set {1, . . . , i} by [i].
A central concept in our work is the notion of a coalition structure. Intuitively, a coalition
structure captures the idea of the players N dividing into separate coalitions, and conven-
tionally, a coalition structure is therefore simply defined as a partition of N [7]. Without any
loss of generality, assume that the coalitions in a structure π are ordered by the following
principle:
coalition Ci will precede a coalition C j in π if the smallest2 element of Ci is less than
the smallest element of C j .
Note that since coalitions in a coalition structure are assumed to be mutually disjoint, then
this ordering is guaranteed to be strict.
Example 1 Suppose N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Then the following are examples of possible coalition
structures over N :
– ({1, 3}, {2}, {4})
– ({1}, {2, 4}, {3})
– ({1, 4}, {2, 3})
However, the following are not legal coalition structures over N , according to our definition:
– ({1, 3}, {1, 2}, {4})—because player 1 is a member of more than one coalition;
– ({1, 3}, {2})—because player 4 does not appear in any coalition;
– ({1, 3}, {4}, {2})—because {4} appears before {2};
2 Recall that a coalition is a set of numbers. The smallest element of a coalition is then the smallest number
in the set. For example, for the coalition C1 = {2, 3, 4}, the smallest element is 2, i.e., min C1 = 2.
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– ({1}, {3, 4}, {2})—because {3, 4} appears before {2}.
unionsq
Formally, we have:
Definition 1 A coalition structure π = (C1, C2, . . . , CM ) over N is a sequence of coalitions
Ci ⊆ N such that:
1.
⋃
1≤i≤M Ci = N ,
2. Ci ∩ C j = ∅for1 ≤ i ≤ M, 1 ≤ j ≤ M s.t.i = j , and
3. for 1 ≤ i ≤ M and 1 ≤ j ≤ M , if i < j then min Ci < min C j .
with the convention min ∅ = ∞.
Let ΠN denote the set of all coalition structures over N . We will use the terms coalition
structure, sequence, and partition synonymously.
Observe that, defined in this way, coalition structures have the following property. In any
coalition structure, player 1 must belong to the first coalition, player 2 must belong to one of
the first two coalitions, and so on. In general, if the players 1, . . . , i (1 ≤ i < n) belong to
the first 1 ≤ m ≤ i non-empty coalitions of any sequence, then player i + 1 must belong to
one of the first m + 1 coalitions in it.
We find it useful to work with a functional representation of coalition structures, which
we call the sequence form. A sequence form representation is simply a function that maps a
given player i to the index of the coalition of which i is a member.
Example 2 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let SF : N → N be a function such that SF(1) = 1,
SF(2) = 2, SF(3) = 3, and SF(4) = 2. Then this sequence form function defines the coalition
structure π = ({1}, {2, 4}, {3}). unionsq
More generally, it is useful to work with sequence form functions that only define coalition
membership for some subset of the overall set of agents:
Definition 2 For 1 ≤ k ≤ n, a sequence form SFk : [k] → N maps each player i ∈ [k] to
the index of a coalition in a sequence. An instance of SFk is any coalition structure π of N
that satisfies the condition
∀i i ∈ [k] ⇒ player i belongs to the coalition SFk(i) in π. unionsq
In general, there may be multiple instances of a sequence form function SFk and we will
write
SFk | π
to denote the fact that π is an instance of SFk . For ease of representation, we will sometimes
write a sequence form as an n-element vector where the i th element gives the index of the
coalition to which player i belongs, or is written as − if the position of player i is not given.
For example, for n = 4, SF2 = (1, 1,−,−) indicates that players 1 and 2 belong to the first
coalition but the positions of players 3 and 4 are not given.
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Example 3 For N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, the sequence function SF2 with SF2(1) = 1 and SF2(2) = 1
specifies the coalitions to which players 1 and 2 belong. Possible instances of this form are:
(1, 1,−,−) | ({1, 2}, {3}, {4})
(1, 1,−,−) | ({1, 2, 3}, {4})
(1, 1,−,−) | ({1, 2, 4}, {3})
(1, 1,−,−) | ({1, 2}, {3, 4})
(1, 1,−,−) | ({1, 2, 3, 4})
For the sequence form SF3 = (1, 2, 1,−), max(SF3) = 2. unionsq
Each coalition structure has a value given by a function v:
v : ΠN → R
A pair (N , v) constitutes a coalition game. Given a coalition game, the problem is to find an
optimal sequence πopt such that:
πopt ∈ arg max
π∈ΠN
v(π).
This problem is, in general, computationally hard because of the huge search space. For a
game of n players, the number of all possible coalition structures is given by Bell(n) [4,31]:
Bell(n) =
n−1∑
k=0
(
n − 1
k
)
× Bell(k)
with Bell(0) = Bell(1) = 1. Since Bell(n) ∼ Θ(nn) [10], it is, in general, infeasible to
compute an optimal coalition structure by exhaustive search over the space of all coalition
structures. Against this background, the aim of our research is to identify specific classes of
value functions that are practically relevant and for which the coalition structure generation
problem can be solved in polynomial time.
In general, there are two specific classes of value functions:
1. A partition value function v is separable [13] if it is the sum of the values of its constituent
coalitions. If vC denotes the value of coalition C , then the overall value of a coalition
structure π is defined as:
v(π) =
∑
C∈π
vC (1)
where vC denotes the value of C ⊆ N . This is the most commonly used function in the
literature. Separable functions may, in turn, be further classified into two types:
(a) The first possibility is that the value of each coalition depends only on the makeup
of that coalition. In this case, and with a slight abuse of notation, we assume that a
value function for coalitions simply takes the form
vC : 2N → R.
This definition of value function corresponds to coalition games in characteristic
function form [7], for which the optimal sequence problem is nothing but the well-
known complete set partitioning problem [20].
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(b) A second possibility is that the value of a coalition depends not just on the makeup
of that coalition, but also on the other coalitions present in the partition [30]. Here,
with another abuse of notation, we can think of the value function for coalitions as
taking the following form.
vC : 2N × ΠN → R (2)
The value of a coalition now depends not just on the make up of the coalition in
question, but also on how the external players (i.e., those outside the coalition) are
organized. For example, for N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, the value of the coalition {1, 2} will
depend on how players 3 and 4 are organized. Thus, the valuev({1, 2}, ({1, 2}, {3, 4}))
may not be equal to v({1, 2}, ({1, 2}, {3}, {4})). This definition of value function
corresponds to coalition games in partition function form.
2. A partition value function v is non-separable if it is not separable.
In what follows, we will consider both separable and non-separable functions that are quasi-
monotonic. Quasi-monotonicity will be defined in terms of a distance metric on the space
ΠN of possible coalition structures.
3 A distancemetric
The metric we consider is defined in terms of the notion of restriction of a partition to a
coalition.
Definition 3 The restriction π|[i] of a coalition structure π = (C1, C2, . . .) to coalition [i]
is defined as
π|[i] = (C1 ∩ [i], C2 ∩ [i], . . .).
For readability, any empty sets will not be shown in π|[i].
Example 4 Suppose N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and π = ({1, 2, 3}, {4}). The restriction of π to [2] is
π|[2] = ({1, 2, 3} ∩ {1, 2}, {4} ∩ {1, 2}) = ({1, 2},∅).
We will eliminate the empty set and write this simply as π|[2] = ({1, 2}). unionsq
For any two coalition structures over N , we have the following readily established property.
Lemma 1 Let π1 ∈ ΠN and π2 ∈ ΠN be any two coalition structures over N = {1, . . . , n}.
Then ∃u ∈ N such that π1|[u] = π2|[u].
Lemma 1 can be proved easily by letting u = 1. Intuitively, the larger the value of u,
then the “closer” π1 and π2 are together. This motivates the introduction of the following
distance metric d , which gives a measure of the distance between any two elements in ΠN :
d(π1, π2) = 1
Δ(π1, π2)
(3)
where
Δ(π1, π2) = max{i ∈ N : π1|[i] = π2|[i]}. (4)
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Table 2 Some examples
illustrating the distances between
coalition structures
π1 π2 Δ(π1, π2) d(π1, π2)
({1, 2}, {3, 4}) ({1}, {2, 3, 4}) 1 1
({1, 2}, {3, 4}) ({1, 2, 3, 4}) 2 1/2
({1, 2}, {3, 4}) ({1, 2}, {3}, {4}) 3 1/3
({1, 2}, {3, 4}) ({1, 2}, {3, 4}) ∞ 0
Example 5 For N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, Table 2 lists some pairs of coalition structures and the
distances between them. unionsq
Then the diameter of a set Π ⊆ ΠN is defined as follows.
Definition 4 The diameter D of a set Π ⊆ ΠN is the maximum distance between any pair
of points in Π :
D(Π) = max
π1∈Π,π2∈Π
d(π1, π2)
We will now prove that a pair (ΠN , d) defines a metric space, which is bounded and such
that D(ΠN ) = 1.
Theorem 1 For two arbitrary sequences π1 ∈ ΠN and π2 ∈ ΠN we have the following
assertions:
1. If π1 = π2 then Δ(π1, π1) = ∞ and so d(π1, π1) = 0.
2. If π1 = π2 then Δ(π1, π2) ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} and d(π1, π2) ∈ { 1
n−1 ,
1
n−2 , . . . , 1}.
Proof Consider the first case, i.e., π1 = π2. Let π1 = (C11 , C12 , . . .) and π2 = (C21 , C22 , . . .).
If π1 = π2 then π1|[i] = π2|[i] for all i ≥ 1, so Δ(π1, π2) = ∞ and d(π1, π2) = 0.
Consider the second case, i.e., π1 = π2. Let z be such that C1i = C2i for 1 ≤ i ≤ z−1 and
C1z = C2z . Then, as per the principle (given in Sect. 2) used to order coalitions in a partition,
the least element in C1z will be identical to the least element in C2z . Let s be this least element
where 1 ≤ s ≤ n and s = 1 iff z = 1. Observe that s = n implies that C1z = {n}, and since
C1i = C2i for 1 ≤ i ≤ z − 1, the coalition C2z must be identical to the coalition C1z , i.e.,
π1 = π2. Thus we need only consider the cases 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 1. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n − s be such
that either of the following two conditions is true:
1. {s, . . . , s + k} ⊆ C1z , and {s, . . . , s + k − 1} ⊆ C2z and s + k /∈ C2z .
2. {s, . . . , s + k} ⊆ C2z , and {s, . . . , s + k − 1} ⊆ C1z and s + k /∈ C1z .
Without any loss of generality, assume that the former is true. Then we get
Δ(π1, π2) = s + k − 1 (5)
Substitute s = 1 in (5), to get Δ(π1, π2) = k. Since 1 ≤ k ≤ n − s, we get Δ(π1, π2) ∈
{1, . . . , n −1} and d(π1, π2) ∈ { 1
n−1 , . . . , 1}. Substitute s = 2 in (5), to Δ(π1, π2) = k +1.
Since 1 ≤ k ≤ n − s, we get Δ(π1, π2) ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1} and d(π1, π2) ∈ { 1
n−1 , . . . ,
1
2 }. In
general, for any s, we get Δ(π1, π2) ∈ {s, . . . , n − 1} and d(π1, π2) ∈ { 1
n−1 , . . . ,
1
s
}. unionsq
We have referred to the function d as a distance metric. We now show that this terminology
is justified, in the sense that d satisfies all metric axioms, viz., non-negativity, symmetry, and
the triangle inequality [39]:
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Fig. 1 Three arbitrary coalition
structures and the distances
between them
Non-negativity: This axiom requires that, for two arbitrary points x and y in the set ΠN ,
d(x, y) ≥ 0 and d(x, y) = 0 ⇔ x = y.
Symmetry: For two arbitrary points x and y in ΠN , d(x, y) = d(y, x).
Triangle inequality: For three arbitrary points x , y, and z in ΠN , d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y)+d(y, z).
Theorem 2 proves that the distance function satisfies the above axioms.
Theorem 2 The distance function defined in (3) satisfies all metric axioms.
Proof Non-negativity follows from Theorem 1: d(π1, π2) ∈ { 1
n−1 ,
1
n−2 , . . . , 1} ∪ {0}. Fur-
ther, for any two structures, π1 and π2, d(π1, π2) = 0 implies that π1 = π2 and π1 = π2
implies d(π1, π2) = 0. As per (3), the distance function is symmetric because Δ [see (4)] is
symmetric.
To prove the triangle inequality axiom, consider three distinct arbitrary sequences π1 =
(C11 , C
1
2 , . . .), π
2 = (C21 , C22 , . . .), and π3 = (C31 , C32 , . . .) with distances as shown in Fig. 1.
The triangle inequality axiom requires that d1 ≤ d2 + d3, i.e.,
1
Δ(π1, π2)
≤ 1
Δ(π2, π3)
+ 1
Δ(π1, π3)
. (6)
For any Δ(π1, π2) and any Δ(π2, π3), Δ(π1, π3) must be the minimum of Δ(π1, π2) and
Δ(π2, π3), i.e., the following equality must be true:
Δ(π1, π3) = min(Δ(π1, π2),Δ(π2, π3))
It now follows that (6) must be true both if min(Δ(π1, π2),Δ(π2, π3)) = Δ(π1, π2) and
also if min(Δ(π1, π2),Δ(π2, π3)) = Δ(π2, π3). unionsq
Theorem 3 establishes that no sequence is equidistant from any two points that are distance
one apart. This result will be used later in the construction of the search method.
Theorem 3 Consider two points π1 and π2 such that d(π1, π2) = 1. Then, ¬∃π3 such that
d(π1, π3) = d(π2, π3).
Proof Given that d(π1, π2) = 1, π1 = (C11 , C12 , . . .) and π2 = (C21 , C22 , . . .) must be in
one of the following two forms [see (4)]:
1. Players 1 and 2 both belong to the same coalition in π1 (i.e., {1, 2} ⊆ C11 ) and to different
coalitions in π2 (i.e., 1 ∈ C21 and 2 ∈ C22 ).
2. Players 1 and 2 both belong to the same coalition in π2 (i.e., {1, 2} ⊆ C21 ) and to different
coalitions in π1 (i.e., 1 ∈ C11 and 2 ∈ C12 ).
Without any loss of generality, we will assume that the first one is true. For the sequence
π3 = (C31 , C32 , . . .), there are two possibilities with regard to players 1 and 2: either {1, 2} ⊆
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C31 or else 1 ∈ C31 and 2 ∈ C32 . Consider the former case. As per (4), Δ(π1, π3) ≥ 2 and
Δ(π2, π3) = 1. Since Δ(π1, π3) = Δ(π2, π3), it is impossible for π3 to be equidistant
from π1 and π2.
Next, consider the case 1 ∈ C31 and 2 ∈ C32 . As per (4), Δ(π2, π3) ≥ 2 and Δ(π1, π3) =
1. Since Δ(π1, π3) = Δ(π2, π3), it is impossible for π3 to be equidistant from π1 and π2.
unionsq
3.1 Uniqueness andmonotonicity
In subsequent sections, we present algorithms for games that satisfy (or do not satisfy) the
following two assumptions:
A1 Uniqueness: There is only one optimal sequence.
A2 Monotonicity: The function v : ΠN → R is monotonically decreasing in the distance
of a sequence from the optimum πopt, i.e., for two arbitrary sequences
π1 and π2 = π1, we have the following implication:
d(πopt, π1) < d(πopt, π2) ⇒ v(π1) > v(π2) (7)
Lemma 2 For 1 ≤ i < n, any sequence in which the first mis-placed player is i + 1 (i.e.,
the players 1, . . . , i are correctly placed in their respective optimal coalitions but not player
i + 1) has a higher value than any sequence in which the first mis-placed player is i (i.e., the
players 1, . . . , i −1 are correctly placed in their respective optimal coalitions but not player
i).
Proof Let π1 be a sequence in which the first mis-placed player is i +1 and π2 be a sequence
in which the first mis-placed player is i . Since d(πopt, π1) < d(πopt, π2), v(π1) > v(π2).
unionsq
Lemma 2 leads to the definition of player priority.
Definition 5 Each player has a priority: player 1 has the highest priority and the priority of
any 1 ≤ i < n is higher than that of player i + 1, i.e., 1  2, . . . , n.
Letting Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) denote priority i player, we have Pi = i .
3.2 Externalities and distance
Let us consider the application of the distance metric to partition function games (PFGs).
We consider three types of externalities in PFGs: positive only, negative only, and positive
and negative externalities. Externalities are positive (negative) only if v(C, π1) ≥ v(C, π2)
for each embedded3 coalition (C, π1) and (C, π2) such that π1 is coarser4 (finer) than π2
[11,40].
Example 6 Table 3 is an illustration of the application of the distance metric to the three
types of externalities. The value of a coalition is given by (2) and that of a partition by (1).
3 An embedded coalition is a pair (C, π) where C ∈ 2N is a coalition in the sequence π ∈ ΠN .
4 A partition π1 is coarser than a partition π2 if each coalition in π2 is included in a coalition in π1: if
C2 ∈ π2, then C2 ⊆ C1 for some C1 ∈ π1. Equivalently, π2 is finer than π1.
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Table 3(a) is for a PFG with positive only externalities. Consider the singleton coalition {1}.
There are two possible structures {1} could be embedded in: ({1}, {2}, {3}) and ({1}, {2, 3}).
Since the latter is coarser than the former, vC ({1}, ({1}, {2, 3})) > vC ({1}, ({1}, {2}, {3})). In
the same way, the condition for positive externalities is satisfied by other entries in the table.
Table 3(b) is for a PFG with negative only externalities. Table 3(c) is for a PFG
with a combination of positive and negative externalities. Since vC ({1}, ({1}, {2, 3})) <
vC ({1}, ({1}, {2}, {3})) in Table 3(c), the externality on {1} due to the merger of coalitions {2}
and {3} is negative. At the same time, since vC ({2}, ({1, 3}, {2})) > vC ({2}, ({1}, {2}, {3})),
the externality on {2} due to the merger of coalitions {1} and {3} is positive. unionsq
Lemma 3 proves the existence of value functions that satisfy both uniqueness and mono-
tonicity properties.
Lemma 3 There exist separable and non-separable value functions that satisfy both mono-
tonicty and uniqueness.
Proof Consider first a separable value function of the form given in (1). For three player PFGs
with positive only externalities, the value function in Table 3(a) satisfies both monotonicity
and uniqueness. For negative only externalities, the value function in Table 3(b) satisfies
both monotonicity and uniqueness. For mixed externalities, the value function in Table 3(c)
satisfies both monotonicity and uniqueness.
Now, consider a non-separable value function of the following form:
v(π) =
|π |∑
i=1
⎛
⎝
i∑
j=1
vC (C j , π)
⎞
⎠
2
For 3-player PFGs with positive only externalities, the value function in Table 4(a) satisfies
both monotonicity and uniqueness. For negative only externalities, the value function in
Table 4(b) satisfies both monotonicity and uniqueness. For mixed externalities, the value
function in Table 4(c) satisfies both monotonicity and uniqueness. unionsq
4 Unique optimum,monotonic values, and a known player ordering
In this section, we consider the problem of computing an optimal coalition structure πopt =
(Copt1 , C
opt
2 , . . .) in games with a known player ordering and under the assumptions A1
(uniqueness) and A2 (monotononicity). In later sections, we will consider cases where these
assumptions do not hold: the assumption A1 will be dropped in Sect. 5 to allow multiple
optima, and A2 will be relaxed in Sect. 6. Then, in Sect. 7, we will consider a setting with
unknown player ordering.
For a unique optimum, monotonic values, and a known player ordering, we will prove
that the optimal coalition structure determination problem is polynomial time solvable and
show how to compute the optimum in polynomial time. Theorem 4, built on Lemma 4, is the
main result of this section.
The method for determining π O PT works as follows. Because of the coalition ordering
principle given in Sect. 2, we know that player 1 must belong to C O PT1 . Knowing this, we
find the coalition in Π O PT to which player 2 must belong. Then, on the basis of the coalitions
to which players 1 and 2 belong, we find the coalition to which player 3 must belong. In
general, we determine the coalition for any player 1 < i < n on the basis of the coalitions
of the players 1 to i − 1. SFOPT will denote a sequence form for π O PT .
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More precisely, suppose that we know the coalitions in πopt = (Copt1 , Copt2 , . . .) to which
each of the players 1, . . . , i − 1 (where i − 1 < n) belongs but do not know the coalitions to
which the players i, . . . , n belong, i.e., we know the optimal sequence form SFOPTi−1 . Based
on this knowledge, we can draw certain conclusions about the coalitions to which player i
will possibly belong. These deductions are characterized in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 For a unique optimum and monotonic value function, suppose the coalition in
πopt = (Copt1 , Copt2 , . . .) to which each of the the players in {1, . . . , i−1}, where i−1 ≤ n−1,
belongs is known. Let m be such that at least one of the first i −1 players belongs to Coptm but
none of them belong to any of the coalitions Coptm+1, Coptm+2, . . .. Then, player i must belong
to a unique coalition Coptp where Coptp ∈ {Copt1 , . . . , Coptm+1}. Further, for two arbitrary
sequence forms SF1i (k) and SF2i (k) such that SF1i (k) = SFOPTi (k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ i and
SF2i (k) = SFOPTi (k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ i − 1 and SF2i (i) = SFOPTi (i), and two arbitrary
sequences π1 = (C11 , C12 , . . .) and π2 = (C21 , C22 , . . .) such that π1 | SF1i and π2 | SF2i ,
the following implication must be true:
i ∈ Coptp ⇒ v(π1) > v(π2). (8)
Proof Because of the ordering on the coalitions in any sequence, player i must belong to
a coalition in {Copt1 , . . . , Coptm+1}. The fact that player i belongs to a unique coalition in
{Copt1 , . . . , Coptm+1} is a consequence of the uniqueness assumption A1.
From the definition of π1 and π2 given in the statement of the lemma, player i is in the
optimal position in π1 but not in π2 (i.e., if i ∈ Coptp , then i ∈ C1p and i /∈ C2p). We therefore
get Δ(πopt, π1) ≥ i and Δ(πopt, π2) = i − 1. That is, if i ∈ Coptp , π1 is closer to πopt than
is π2, so by monotonicity assumption, the value of π1 must be greater than the value of π2.
unionsq
The intuitive meaning of Lemma 4 is that the value of any sequence in which the players
1, . . . , i belong to that coalition to which they belong in πOPT is greater than the value of
any sequence in which only the players 1, . . . , i − 1 belong to the coalition to which they
belong in πOPT. Example 7 is an illustration of Lemma 4.
Example 7 Suppose the set of players is N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. It is known that player 1 (2) belongs
to the first (second) coalition in πopt, i.e., {1} ⊆ Copt1 and {2} ⊆ Copt2 . Given this, player 3
must belong to any one of the first three coalitions in πopt, i.e., there are three possibilities
for SF3: (1, 2, 1,−), or (1, 2, 2,−), or (1, 2, 3,−). From these sequence forms, we get the
instances (1, 2, 1,−) | π1, (1, 2, 2,−) | π2, and (1, 2, 3,−) | π3 and the following
implications:
3 ∈ Copt1 ⇒ v(π1) > v(π2) ∧ v(π1) > v(π3) The value of any instance π1 is
greater than that value of any π2 and any π3.
3 ∈ Copt2 ⇒ v(π2) > v(π1) ∧ v(π2) > v(π3) The value of any instance π2 is
greater than that value of any π1and any π3.
3 ∈ Copt3 ⇒ v(π3) > v(π1) ∧ v(π3) > v(π2) The value of any instance π3 is
greater than that value of any π1and any π2.
unionsq
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For the purpose of determining an optimal partition, it is not necessary to know the function
v (i.e., the actual values of the partitions). It is enough to know if the value of a partition is
higher/ lower than another partition. This will become evident in the proof of Theorem 4.
Theorem 4 If the optimum is unique and the value function monotonic, the optimal sequence
πopt can be determined in O(n3) time.
Proof The position of player 1: Because of the coalition ordering principle for sequences, we
know that player 1 must belong to the first coalition of any sequence, i.e., we have 1 ∈ Copt1 .
This takes O(1) time.
The position of player 2: Since 1 ∈ Copt1 , by Lemma 4, player 2 must belong either to
Copt1 or to C
opt
2 . Consider the sequence π1 = ({1, 2 . . . , n}) comprised of the single grand
coalition and the sequence π2 = ({1}, {2}, . . . , {n}) of n singletons. The values of π1 and
π2 can be related in one of the following three ways:
1. v(π1) = v(π2)
2. v(π1) > v(π2)
3. v(π1) < v(π2)
We will consider each of these three possibilities. Suppose v(π1) = v(π2) which implies
that neither π1 nor π2 is the optimal sequence (due to the uniqueness assumption A1).
Since v(π1) = v(π2), the consequent of (Equation 7) becomes false. By contrapositive, its
antecedant must be false, i.e., have:
d(πopt, π1) ≥ d(πopt, π2) (9)
In the same way, we get:
d(πopt, π1) ≤ d(πopt, π2) (10)
(9) and (10) can both be true only for d(πopt, π1) = d(πopt, π2). But as per Theorem 3, no
point is equidistant from π1 and π2 because π1 and π2 are distance one apart. Clearly, the
relation v(π1) = v(π2) is impossible.
Next, suppose v(π1) > v(π2). By Lemma 4, we get:
2 ∈ Copt1 ⇒ v(π1) > v(π2) (11)
and
2 ∈ Copt2 ⇒ v(π2) > v(π1). (12)
Since v(π1) > v(π2), the consequent of the implication in (12) is false. By contrapositive,
its antecedant must be false, i.e., player 2 cannot belong to Copt2 . So he must belong to Copt1
and we get:
{1, 2} ⊆ Copt1
Next, suppose v(π1) < v(π2). Then the consequent of the implication in (11) is false. By
contrapositive, its antecedant must be false, i.e., player 2 cannot belong to Copt1 . So he must
belong to Copt2 :
1 ∈ Copt1 and 2 ∈ Copt2
It takes O(n) time to assign to π1 the sequence comprised of n singletons and to π2 the
sequence comprised of the grand coalition. So the position of player 2 can be found in O(n)
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time. Observe that to find this position, it is enough to know the relation between the values
of π1 and π2 (i.e., whether v(π1) < v(π2) or v(π1) > v(π2)), but their actual values are
not required. At this stage, we know the positions of players 1 and 2 in πopt.
The positions of players 3 ≤ i ≤ n: In general, the position of player 3 ≤ i ≤ n in
πopt must be found given the positions of each of the players 1, . . . , i − 1. If m is such
that at least one of the first i − 1 players belongs to Coptm but none of them belong to any
of {Coptm+1, Coptm+2, . . .}, by Lemma 4, player i must belong to a unique coalition in the set
{Copt1 , . . . , Coptm+1}. This coalition is determined as follows. For each 1 ≤ p ≤ m +1, choose
an instance π p = (C p1 , C p2 , . . .) such that players 1 to i − 1 are in their respective optimal
positions, player i is in coalition C pp , and players i + 1 to n are singletons. Between the
instances π1, . . . πm+1, call the one with the highest value πmax . Since 1 ≤ max ≤ m + 1,
we will consider each one of the m + 1 possibilities.
If max = 1, then for each π p where p = max , v(π p) > v(π j ) will be false. That is, the
consequent of the implication (8) will be false and by contrapositive, its antecedant must be
false, i.e., player i cannot belong to any coalition Coptp where p = max . Thus, i ∈ Coptmax .
We have now determined the coalition in πopt to which player i belongs.
For each 3 ≤ i ≤ n and each 1 ≤ p ≤ m + 1, it takes O(n) time to assign a sequence to
π p . A sequence can be assigned to all π1, . . . , πm+1 in O(n2) time, after which max can be
found in O(n) time. The position of all the n players can therefore be determined in O(n3).
Observe that, for each 3 ≤ i ≤ n, it is enough to know the relation (> or <) between the
values of coalition structures, their actual values are not required. unionsq
Algorithm 1, based on Theorem 4, is a greedy method for finding the optimal sequence
πopt = (Copt1 , Copt2 , . . .). In this method, the coalition in πopt to which player 1 belongs
is determined first. Then, the positions of the remaining players are determined one by one:
the position of player 2 ≤ i ≤ n is determined on the basis of the positions of players
1, . . . , i − 1.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for finding the optimal sequence πopt = (Copt1 , Copt2 , . . .).
1: πopt ← (∅, . . . ,∅); {Initialize the sequence πopt to empty coalitions}
2: Copt1 ← Copt1 ∪ {1}; {Add player 1 to the first coalition}
3: for i ← 2, n do {Find the coalitions in πopt to which players 2, . . . , n belong}
4: Let m be such that at least one of the first i − 1 players belongs to Coptm
but none of them belongs to any of the coalitions Coptm+1, Coptm+2, . . .;
5: For 1 ≤ p ≤ m + 1, let π p be the sequence π p = {C p1 , C p2 , · · · } such that the first
i −1 players are in their respective optimal positions, player i is in C pp , and players i +1
to n are singletons;
6: Between π1, . . . , πm+1, call the one with highest value πmax ;
7: Coptmax ← Coptmax ∪ {i};
8: end for
9: return πopt
In more detail, Line 2 of Algorithm 1 assigns player 1 to the first coalition Copt1 . The for
loop in Line 3 finds the coalition in πopt to which each of the players 2 ≤ i ≤ n belongs.
The steps within this loop are repeated n − 1 times; in iteration 2 ≤ i ≤ n, the coalition in
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Fig. 2 The optimal position for
player 2 can be determined by
comparing the value of any one
partition in block (a) to any one
partition in block (b)
3  1   2 4 
4 1     2     3 
  1   2   3   4 
 3   4  1   2 
3 1     2     4 
1 2  3   4 
1 2 3 4 
1  2    4 3 
1  2   3 4 
 2   3   4 1 
 2  3  1   4 
2  1    3    4 
2  1   4 3 
2  1  3 4 
 2  4  1  3 
(a) (b) 
πopt to which player i belongs is greedily determined as follows. Suppose that at least one
of the first i − 1 players belongs to Coptm but none of them belong to any of the coalitions
Coptm+1, Coptm+2, . . .. In each iteration of the for loop of Line 5, the sequence π p = {C p1 , C p2 , · · · }
is such that the first i − 1 players are in their respective optimal positions, player i is in C pp
and players i + 1 to n are singletons. Thus these m + 1 structures differ only in the position
of one player. Between the instances π1, . . . πm+1, call the one with the highest value πmax
(this is Line 6 of Algorithm 1). Then player i must belong to the coalition Coptmax (this is Line
7 of Algorithm 1).
Line 1 takes O(n) time, Line 2 O(1), and Line 4 O(n). Lines 4 to 7 together take O(n)
time. Since the for loop of Line 3 is repeated n − 1 times, the overall time complexity of
Algorithm 1 is O(n2).
Example 8 illustrates the operation of Algorithm 1.
Example 8 Suppose the set of players is N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. There are 15 possible sequences
and their values are as listed in Table 5. The optimum is πopt = ({1, 3}{2, 4}). Player 1 must
belong to the first coalition in πOPT. Given this, the optimal position for player 2 must be
either the first or the second coalition. Figure 2a lists all those partitions in which the players
1 and 2 are apart and Fig. 2b lists all those partitions in which they are together. If the optimal
position for player 2 is the first (second) coalition, then per monotonicity, the value of each
partition in Fig. 2a will be less (greater) than the value of each partition in Fig. 2b. Thus
to determine the optimal position for player 2, it is enough to compare any one partition in
Fig. 2a with any one in Fig. 2b. Compare the values of the partition π1 comprised of all
singletons with the partition π2 comprised only of the grand coalition. Since v(π1) = 6 and
v(π2) = 2, the optimal position for player 2 must be the second coalition. At this stage, we
know that 1 ∈ Copt1 and 2 ∈ Copt2 .
Given that the players 1 and 2 belong to different coalitions, the optimal position for player
3 must be one of the first three coalitions. Figure 3a lists all those partitions in which the
player 3 belongs to the first coalition, Fig. 3b those partitions in which the player 3 belongs
to the second coalition, and Fig. 3c those partitions in which the player 3 belongs to the third
coalition. Consider partition π1 = ({1, 3}{2}{4}) of block (a), π2 = ({1}{2, 3}{4}) of block
(b) and π3 = ({1}{2}{3, 4}) of block (c). Between these three, the one with highest value is
v(π1) = 9 so player 3 must belong to the first coalition. At this stage, we know that 1 ∈ Copt1 ,
2 ∈ Copt2 , and 3 ∈ Copt1 .
The optimal position for player 4 must be one of the first three coalitions, so πopt must be
one of the partitions ({1, 3, 4}{2}), ({1, 3}{2, 4}), or ({1, 3}{2}{4}). The optimum is πopt =
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Table 5 An example for n = 4
with πopt = ({1, 3}, {2, 4}) Sequence π v(π) Δ(π
opt, π j ) d(πopt, π j )
({1}, {2}, {3}, {4}) 6 2 1/2
({1, 2}, {3}, {4}) 2 1 1
({1, 3}, {2}, {4}) 9 3 1/3
({1, 4}, {2}, {3}) 7 2 1/2
({1}, {2, 3}, {4}) 5 2 1/2
({1}, {2, 4}, {3}) 7 2 1/2
({1}, {2}, {3, 4}) 5 2 1/2
({1, 2}, {3, 4}) 2 1 1
({1, 3}, {2, 4}) 10 ∞ 0
({1, 4}, {2, 3}) 3 2 1/2
({1, 2, 3}, {4}) 1 1 1
({1, 2, 4}, {3}) 2 1 1
({1, 3, 4}, {2}) 8 3 1/3
({1}, {2, 3, 4}) 6 2 1/2
({1, 2, 3, 4}) 2 1 1
Fig. 3 The optimal position for
player 3 can be determined by
choosing any one partition from
each of the three blocks and,
between them, finding the one
with highest value
1 2  3   4 
1  2    4 3 
 2   3   4 1 
 2  3  1   4 
2  1    3    4  2   3  1   4 
 2  3  1   4  4    1  3 1 2 3 4 
(a) (b) 
 2  4  1  3 
 2   
(c) 
({1, 3}{2, 4}) because, between the three possibilities, it has the highest value. Thus with five
comparisons (one comparison to find the optimal position for player 2, two each to find the
optimal position for players 3 and 4), we found the optimal partition.
5 Multiple optima, monotonic values, and a known player ordering
For a known player ordering, we will allow multiple optima. ΠOPT will denote the set5 of
all optimal sequences. The monotonicity assumption is now defined as follows:
5 Observe that the setting in Sect. 3.1 corresponds to ΠOPT containing an single element.
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A¯2 Monotonicity: The function v : ΠN → R is monotonically decreasing in the distance
of a sequence from each optimum, i.e., the following implication must be true:
∀π1, π2, π3 ( π1 ∈ ΠOPT ∧ π2 /∈ ΠOPT ∧ π3 /∈ ΠOPT ∧ d(π1, π2) < d(π1, π3)
⇒ v(π2) > v(π3) ) (13)
As a consequence of the monotonicity assumption, the elements that comprise ΠOPT are
restricted to those partitions that are a certain distance apart. This is proven in Theorem 5.
Theorem 5 If the value function v is monotonic, then any two optima are distance 1/(n − 1)
apart, i.e., the following implication must be true:
∀π1, π2 π1 ∈ ΠOPT ∧ π2 ∈ ΠOPT ∧ π1 = π2 ⇒ d(π1, π2) = 1/(n − 1) (14)
Proof By contradiction. As per Theorem 1, we have 1 ≤ Δ(π1, π2) ≤ n − 1. Assume that
Δ(π1, π2) = 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 2. Let SF1 denote a sequence form for π1 and SF2 that for
π2. Consider two arbitrary points SF1k+1 | π3 and SF2k+1 | π4 such that π3 /∈ ΠOPT and
π4 /∈ ΠOPT. Then we have:
d(π1, π3) ≤ 1/(k + 1) (15)
d(π1, π4) = 1/k (16)
d(π2, π3) = 1/k (17)
d(π2, π4) ≤ 1/(k + 1) (18)
With respect to the optimum π1, the monotonicity assumption of (13) requires that
v(π3) > v(π4) (19)
because d(π1, π3) < d(π1, π4) [as per (15) and (16)]. However, with respect to the optimum
π2, the monotonicity assumption of (13) requires that
v(π3) < v(π4) (20)
because d(π2, π3) > d(π2, π4) [as per (17) and (18)]. (19) and (20) are contradictory.
So the assumption that Δ(π1, π2) = 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 2 must be false and its negation, i.e.,
Δ(π1, π2) > n − 2, must be true. As per Theorem 1, 1 ≤ Δ(π1, π2) ≤ n − 1, so we get
Δ(π1, π2) = n − 1, i.e., d(π1, π2) = 1/(n − 1). unionsq
Intuitively, Theorem 5 means that any two sequences in ΠOPT can differ only with respect
to the position of player n. In other words, the position, in any optimal sequence, of each player
1 . . . , n − 1 is unique. For example, for n = 4, it is possible for the sequences ({1, 2}{3}{4})
and ({1, 2}{3, 4}) to belong to ΠOPT because the distance between them is 1/(n−1) and they
differ only in terms of the position of player 4. However, if ({1, 2}{3}{4}) is in ΠOPT then
({1}{2, 3}{4}) cannot be in ΠOPT because d(({1, 2}{3}{4}), ({1}{2, 3}{4})) = 1/(n −1). The
uniqueness of the positions of players 1, . . . , n − 1 is formalized in Lemma 5.
Let β iπ denote the index of the coalition in π to which player i belongs. In Lemma 5, we
show that, for a π ∈ Π O PT , β iπ is unique for each 1 ≤ i < n.
Lemma 5 In any optimal sequence π ∈ ΠOPT, there must be a unique coalition to which
each player 1 ≤ i < n belongs.
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Proof The proof is by contradiction. Consider a partition π1 ∈ ΠOPT, and another partition
π2 ∈ ΠOPT. Consider any i (where 1 ≤ i < n), and let player i belong to the coalition C1r in
π1 and the coalition C2s in π2. Assume that r = s. Without any loss of generality, suppose
that r < s. As per the definition of Δ given in (4), this supposition entails the following
relation:
Δ(π1, π2) < i (21)
In the statement of the lemma, we are given that 1 ≤ i < n. Thus, (21) can also be written
as
Δ(π1, π2) < n − 1 (22)
But by Theorem 5, d(π1, π2) = 1/(n − 1). Equivalently, we have the following relation:
Δ(π1, π2) = n − 1 (23)
But (23) contradicts (22), so the assumption that r = s must be false. So its negation must
be true, i.e., in any optimal sequence, there must be a unique coalition to which player
1 ≤ i < n − 1 belongs. unionsq
From Theorem 5, it also follows that each point that is not a member of ΠOPT is equidistant
from each point in ΠOPT (see Lemma 6 for proof).
Lemma 6 If the value function v is monotonic, then each point that is not a member of ΠOPT
must be equidistant from each point in ΠOPT, i.e., the following implication must be true:
∀π1, π2, π3 ( π1 ∈ ΠOPT ∧ π2 ∈ ΠOPT ∧ π3 /∈ ΠOPT ∧ π1 = π2
⇒ d(π1, π3) = d(π2, π3) )
Proof From Theorem 5 we have Δ(π1, π2) = n − 1. Assume that Δ(π1, π3) = 1 ≤ k ≤
n −1. The two facts Δ(π1, π2) = n −1 and Δ(π1, π3) = k together imply Δ(π2, π3) = k.
The partition π3 is therefore equidistant from π1 and π2. unionsq
The above analysis leads to the following key insight. The setting with multiple optima
differs from the one with a unique optimum in terms of the uniqueness of the coalition to
which a player belongs. If the optimum is unique, each of the n players must belong to a
unique coalition in πOPT (see Lemma 4). For multiple optima, each of the players 1, . . . , n−1
must belong to a unique coalition in any optimum but the position of player n may differ
from one optimum to another (see Lemma 5). Lemma 7 is a formalization of this insight and
it is the multiple optima analog of Lemma 4.
Lemma 7 Suppose the coalition in πopt = (Copt1 , Copt2 , . . .) to which each of the the players
in {1, . . . , 1 ≤ i −1 ≤ n−2} belongs is known. Let m be such that at least one of the first i −1
players belongs to Coptm but none of them belong to any of the coalitions Coptm+1, Coptm+2, . . ..
Then, player i must belong to a unique coalition Coptp where Coptp ∈ {Copt1 , . . . , Coptm+1}.
Further, for two arbitrary sequence forms SF1i (k)and SF2i (k) such that SF1i (k) = SFOPTi (k)
for 1 ≤ k ≤ i and SF2i (k) = SFOPTi (k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ i − 1 and SF2i (i) = SFOPTi (i), and
two arbitrary sequences π1 = (C11 , C12 , . . .) and π2 = (C21 , C22 , . . .) such that π1 | SF1i
and π2 | SF2i , the following implication must be true:
i ∈ Coptp ⇒ v(π1) > v(π2). (24)
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Proof As Lemma 4. unionsq
Observe that the difference between Lemma 4 and Lemma 7 is that the former draws
inferences about the position of any player 1 ≤ i ≤ n given the positions of all the palyers
1, . . . , i −1, while the latter draws inferences about the position of any player 1 ≤ i ≤ n −1
given the positions of all the players 1, . . . , i − 1. We are now ready to present the main
result of this section. Theorem 6 is a constructive proof of polynomial time complexity of
computing optima.
Theorem 6 If there are multiple optima and the value function is monotonic, all the optimal
sequences in Πopt can be determined in O(n2) time.
Proof For multiple optima, there is a unique coalition to which each player except player n
belongs in any optimum (see Lemma 5). For a unique optimum, there is a unique coalition
to which each of the n players belongs (see Lemma 4). Given this, the optimal positions of
players 1, . . . , n − 1 for multiple optima can be determined in O(n2) time as was done in
the proof of Theorem 4.
Let m be such that at least one of the first n − 1 players belongs to Coptm but none of
them belongs to any of the coalitions Coptm+1, Coptm+2, . . .. By fixing the positions of these n −1
players, it is possible to generate m + 1 different sequences of n players. If ΠPOS denotes
the set of these m + 1 sequences then ΠOPT ⊆ ΠPOS. By searching the set ΠPOS, the set of
all optima be found in O(n) time.
The total time required to find all the optimal sequences is O(n2) which is the sum of the
time taken to find the optimal position of each of the players 1, . . . , n − 1 (i.e., O(n2)) and
the time to find the optimal positions of player n (i.e., O(n)). As in Theorem 4, information
is required only about the relation (> or <) between the values of partitions but not their
actual values. unionsq
Algorithm 2 is an extension of Algorithm 1, and Theorem 6 is proof of correctness of this
algorithm. As far as Line 9, Algorithm 2 is the same as Algorithm 1, except for the index of
the for loop of Line 3. By the end of the for loop of Line 3, the optimal positions of the first
n − 1 players will have been determined by Algorithm 2. Lines 10 to 12 are for determining
the set Sopt of optimal structures. The m + 1 sequences, π1, . . . , πm+1, form the superset of
S
opt
, and this superset is then searched to find Sopt.
Now consider the time complexity of Algorithm 2. We already know (from the analysis
of Algorithm 1) that Lines 1 to 9 take O(n2) time. Lines 10 to 12 require O(n) time. The
time complexity of Algorithm 2 is therefore O(n2).
6 Multiple optima, quasi-monotonic values, and a known player
ordering
For a known ordering, we allow multiple optima and relax the monotonicity assumption. As
before, ΠOPT denotes the set of all optima. Let qmax and qmin be defined as follows:
qmin = min
π1∈ΠOPT,π2∈ΠOPT
Δ(π1, π2)
qmax = max
π1∈ΠOPT,π2∈ΠOPT
Δ(π1, π2)
In words, qmin (qmax ) is the the minimum (maximum) Δ for any two optimal sequences.
Observe that D(ΠOPT) = 1/qmin .
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm for finding the set Sopt of all optimal sequences.
1: πopt ← (∅, . . . ,∅); {Initialize the sequence πopt to empty coalitions}
2: Copt1 ← Copt1 ∪ {1}; {Add player 1 to the first coalition}
3: for i ← 2, n − 1 do {Find the coalitions in πopt to which players 2, . . . , n − 1 belong}
4: Suppose that at least one of the first i − 1 players belongs to Coptm but
5: none of them belong to any of the coalitions Coptm+1, Coptm+2, . . .;
6: For 1 ≤ p ≤ m + 1, let the sequence π p = {C p1 , C p2 , · · · } be such that the first i − 1
players are in their respective optimal positions, player i is in C pp , and players i + 1 to n
are singletons;
7: Between π1, . . . , πm+1, call the one with highest value πmax ;
8: Coptmax ← Coptmax ∪ {i}
9: end for
{Find each coalition in πopt to which player n can possibly belong:}
10: Suppose that at least one of the first n − 1 players belongs to Coptm but none of them
belong to any of the coalitions Coptm+1, Coptm+2, . . .;
11: For 1 ≤ p ≤ m + 1 let the sequence π p = {C p1 , C p2 , · · · } be such that the first n − 1
players are in their respective optimal positions and player n is in C pp ;
12: Sopt ← {π | π ∈ {π1, . . . , πm+1} ∧ π ′ ∈ {π1, . . . , πm+1} ∧ v(π ′) > v(π)};
13: return Sopt
For this setting, the value function v need be monotonic only for a subset of ΠN . Let
ΠMON denote the set of all those non-optimal points that are more distant than the diameter
of ΠOPT from each point in ΠOPT. Then a function v is quasi-monotonic if the set of points
in ΠMON satisfy monotonicity. Formally, quasi-monotonicity is stated as follows:
¯¯A2 Quasi-monotonicity: The function v : ΠMON → R is monotonically decreasing in the
distance of a sequence from each optimum, i.e., the following implication must be true:
∀π1, π2, π3 ( π1 ∈ ΠMON ∧ π2 ∈ ΠMON ∧ π3 ∈ ΠOPT
∧ d(π3, π1) < d(π3, π2) ⇒ v(π1) > v(π2) )
In order to give an indication of the size of search space for which v is monotonic relative
to the size of the space for which it is not, we introduce the terms ‘degree of monotonicity’,
and ‘degree of non-monotonicity’, of v.
Definition 6 For multiple optima and a quasi-monotonic v, the degree of monotonicity is
qmin and the degree of non-monotonicity is n − qmin .
Observe that the degree of monotonicity (non-monotonicity) is increasing (decreasing) in
qmin . Lemmas 8 and 9 establish preliminary results which we use to build the main result on
time complexity in Theorem 7.
Lemma 8 If the value function v is quasi-monotonic then each point in the set ΠMON must
be equidistant from each point in ΠOPT, i.e., we have the implication:
∀π1, π2, π3 π1 ∈ ΠMON ∧ π2 ∈ ΠOPT ∧ π3 ∈ ΠOPT ⇒ d(π1, π2) = d(π1, π3)
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Proof The proof is by contradiction. Consider any three points π1 ∈ ΠMON π2 ∈ ΠOPT,
and π3 ∈ ΠOPT. Given that the diameter of ΠOPT is 1/qmin , we get d(π2, π3) ≤ 1/qmin .
Equivalently, Δ(π2, π3) ≥ qmin , and we get:
β i
π2 = β iπ3 for 1 ≤ i ≤ qmin (25)
As per the definition of ΠMON, d(π1, π2) > 1/qmin and d(π1, π3) > 1/qmin . Equiva-
lently, Δ(π1, π2) < qmin and Δ(π1, π3) < qmin . Denote Δ(π1, π2) as r and Δ(π1, π3) as
s. Assume that r = s. Without any loss of generality, suppose that r < s where s < qmin .
Then the player r + 1 must belong to different coalitions in π1 and π2, i.e.,
βr+1
π1
= βr+1
π2
(26)
However, because r < s and Δ(π1, π3) = s, we get:
βr+1
π1
= βr+1
π3
(27)
(26) and (27) entail the following inequality:
βr+1
π3
= βr+1
π2
(28)
Since r < s < qmin , we get r + 1 < qmin . Since r + 1 < qmin , (28) contradicts (25). This
renders the assumption r = s false. So each point in the set ΠMON must be equidistant from
each point in ΠOPT. unionsq
Lemma 9 In any optimal sequence π ∈ ΠOPT, there must be a unique coalition to which
each player 1 ≤ i ≤ qmin belongs.
Proof The proof is by contradiction. Consider a partition π1 ∈ ΠOPT, and another partition
π2 ∈ ΠOPT. Let player 1 ≤ i ≤ qmin belong to the coalition C1r in π1 and the coalition C2s
in π2. Assume that r = s. Without any loss of generality, suppose that r < s. As per the
definition of Δ given in (4), this supposition entails the following relation:
Δ(π1, π2) < i (29)
As per the coalition ordering principle given in Sect. 2, in any partition, player i must belong
to any one of the first i coalitions, i.e., r < s ≤ i . Since i ≤ qmin , we can write (29) as
follows:
Δ(π1, π2) < qmin (30)
But we are given that the diameter of ΠOPT is 1/qmin . Equivalently, we have the following
relation:
Δ(π1, π2) ≥ qmin (31)
Clearly, (31) and (30) are contradictory. The assumption that r = s must be false and its
negation must be true, i.e., in any optimal sequence, there must be a unique coalition to which
player 1 ≤ i < qmin belongs. unionsq
Theorem 7 If there are multiple optima and value function is quasi-monotonic, an optimal
sequence can be determined in O(n2) + O(nn−qmin ) time.
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Proof As per Lemma 9, each player 1 ≤ i ≤ qmin must belong to a unique coalition in any
optimal partition. Thus the position of each of the players 1, . . . , qmin can be determined as
in the proof of Theorem 4 in O(n2) time.
The sequence form in which the position of each of the players 1, . . . , qmin is fixed to
their respective optimal positions, gives rise to O(nn−qmin ) instances. A brute force search
on these O(nn−qmin ) partitions will yield an optimal partition.
Since it takes O(n2) time to find the optimal positions of the players 1, . . . , qmin and
O(nn−qmin ) time for exhaustively searching the space of remaining possible partitions, the
total search time will be O(n2) + O(nn−qmin ). unionsq
It is now evident that the search time is least for n − 1 ≤ qmin ≤ n − 3 as the optimal
positions of the players 1, . . . , n −4 can be found in O(n2) time and the non-monotonic part
can also be searched in O(n2) resulting in an overall polynomial time complexity of O(n2).
As the degree of non-monotonicity increases, the time complexity successively worsens
becoming increasingly exponential and reaching the extreme of O(nn−1) for qmin = 1
which corresponds to the entire search space being non-monotonic.
The search method is formulated in Algorithm 3. Algorithm 3 is similar to Algorithm 2
in finding the coalition to which player 1 ≤ i ≤ qmin belongs. Thereafter, the search space is
comprised of all possible instances of SFqmin and this must be searched to find an optimum.
The time to find an optimum by using brute force over the space of possible instances of
SFqmin is O(nn−qmin ).
Algorithm 3 Algorithm for narrowing down the search space.
1: πopt ← (∅, . . . ,∅); {Initialize the sequence πopt to empty coalitions}
2: Copt1 ← Copt1 ∪ {1}; {Add player 1 to the first coalition}
3: for i ← 2, qmin do {Find the coalitions in πopt to which players 2, . . . , qmin belong}
4: Suppose player 1 ≤ i − 1 ≤ n − 2 belongs to one of Copt1 , . . . , Copt1≤m≤i−1;
5: For 1 ≤ p ≤ m + 1, choose any sequence π p = {C p1 , C p2 , · · · } such that SFi | π p
and i ∈ C pp ;
6: Between π1, . . . , πm+1, call the one with highest value πmax ;
7: Coptmax ← Coptmax ∪ {i}
8: end for
In summary, a quasi-monotonic space of all possible partitions is searched in the following
two stages:
1. First, for the monotonic part, run Algorithm 3 to obtain an optimal sequence form SFqmin .
2. Next, use brute force to search only the instances of SFqmin .
Observe that none of the proposed greedy methods (viz., Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2, or
Algorithm 3) needs numeric values of coalition structures. Only an ordering on the values is
needed.
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Table 6 Step 1: Monotonicity induced implications
Label Implication
X1
(
i, j, 1, 1) L⇒ (∀π1, π2 (β i
π1 = β jπ1) ∧ (β iπ2 = β
j
π2
)
R⇒ v(π1) > v(π2) )
X2
(
i, j, 1, 2) L⇒ (∀π1, π2 (β i
π1 = β jπ1) ∧ (β iπ2 = β
j
π2
)
R⇒ v(π1) > v(π2) )
7 Unique optimum,monotonic values, and an unknown player
ordering
So far, we considered games with a known player ordering. Now we will consider a setting in
which a player ordering is known to exist but the ordering itself is unknown. We still have the
assumptions A1 (i.e., a unique optimal sequence) and A2 (monotonicity) defined in Sect. 3.1.
In more detail, it is known that the i th priority player Pi is a unique element of the set N
but it is not known which element of N it is. For this setting, we prove in Sect. 7.1 that the
optimal coalition structure determination problem is solvable in polynomial time and devise
such an algorithm. Then, in Sect. 7.2, we illustrate the working of this algorithm for 3-player
games.
7.1 n-Player games
In this setting, the identities of the players P1, . . . , Pn and their optimal coalitions are
unknown. All we know is that the identity of each Pi and its optimal coalition is unique.
For this, we will first informally outline the key steps of our method for finding the optimal
sequence and then proceed to formal constructive proofs in Theorems 8 to 10 and Lemmas 10
to 19. A detailed formulation of the method is in Algorithms 4 and 5.
At a high level, our method for determining the optimal sequence is comprised of two key
steps:
Step 1 Determine who the two top priority players are, and their optimal coalitions.
Step 2 For 3 ≤ i ≤ n, determine the identity of the player Pi and its optimal coalition.
Consider Step 1 first. To begin, we know that P1 ∈ N , so there are n possibilities for the
identity of P1. We also know that its optimal coalition must be C O PT1 . Then, for any one
possibility for P1, say P1 = x , we know that there must be n − 1 possibilities for the identity
of P2, i.e., P2 ∈ N − {x}, and that there must be two possibilities for its optimal coalition,
i.e., P2 must be a member of either C O PT1 or C
O PT
2 . Let Z be the set of all these possibilities
and let each element of Z be a quadruple defined as follows:
Z = {(x, y, 1, z) | x ∈ N , y ∈ N − {x}, z ∈ {1, 2}}
The semantics of a quadruple is that the first element is the identity of player P1, the second
element is the identity of P2, the third element is x’s optimal coalition (i.e., x ∈ C O PT1 ),
and the last element is y’s optimal coalition (i.e., y ∈ C O PTz ). For example, the quadruple
(2, 3, 1, 2) means that P1 = 2, P2 = 3, 2 ∈ C O PT1 , and 3 ∈ C O PT2 .
We find it convenient to introduce terminology for referring to certain pairs of elements
of Z .
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Definition 7 For any x ∈ N and any y ∈ N −{x}, (x, y, 1, 1) and (y, x, 1, 1) are each others’
partners, and (x, y, 1, 2) and (y, x, 1, 2) are each others’ partners. A partner pair is in one
of the following forms:
– ((x, y, 1, 1), (y, x, 1, 1))
– ((x, y, 1, 2), (y, x, 1, 2))
Lemma 10 readily follows from the definition of Z and that of a partner pair.
Lemma 10 The set Z satisfies the following assertions:
– |Z | = 2 × n × (n − 1).
– Every element in Z has a unique partner in Z.
– Every element in Z is the partner of a unique element in Z.
For monotonic value functions, each one of the possibilities in Z induces a relation between
the values of certain structures. For instance, consider the element (1, 2, 1, 1) of Z . The
semantics of (1, 2, 1, 1) is that P1 = 1, P2 = 2, 1 ∈ C O PT1 , and 2 ∈ C O PT1 . For this specific
possibility, monotonicity induces the following implication:
(
1, 2, 1, 1
) L⇒ (∀π1, π2 (β1
π1 = β2π1) ∧ (β1π2 = β2π2)
R⇒ v(π1) > v(π2) )
In words, if (P1 = 1∧P2 = 2∧1 ∈ C O PT1 ∧2 ∈ C O PT1 ), then every structure π1 in which the
players 1 and 2 are in the same coalition must have a higher value than every structure π2 in
which they are in different coalitions. In general, for the quadruple (i, j, 1, 1), monotonicity
induces the implication labelled X1 in Table 6. In the same way, for the quadruple (i, j, 1, 2),
monotonicity induces the implication X2 in Table 6.
Now, consider the possibility that (P1 = 1 ∧ P2 = 2 ∧ 1 ∈ C O PT1 ∧ 2 ∈ C O PT1 ), i.e., for
i = 1 and j = 2, the antecedant of the implication X1 is true. This means that the consequent
of L⇒ must be true. However, if we can find some π1 and π2 such that (β1
π1
= β2
π1
)∧ (β1
π2
=
β2
π2
) and v(π1) ≤ v(π2), then the antecedant of R⇒ will be be true but its consequent will be
false. So the consequent of L⇒ will be false, and by contrapositive, its antecedant must be false.
This means we can eliminate the possibility that (P1 = 1∧P2 = 2∧1 ∈ C O PT1 ∧2 ∈ C O PT1 ).
We use this idea to set up certain tests for comparing the values of certain structures in a
way that will enable us to eliminate those possibilities from Z that are guaranteed not to
correspond to the optimal structure.
We define two tests called T 1 and T 2 listed in Table 7. Each test compares the values of
two partitions. The test T 1 is a comparison of the values of the partition πG comprised of the
single grand coalition and the partition π S comprised of all singletons. The test T 2(i, j) is
a comparison of the values of the partitions (N − {i}, {i}) and (N − { j}, { j}) where i and j
are any two distinct players. Each of these tests will result in one of three possible outcomes:
<, =, or >. Depending on the resulting outcome, certain deductions can be made about who
the two top priority players are and whether they belong to the same or to different coalitions
in π O PT .
In more detail, the purpose of test T 1 is to determine whether or not the two top priority
players belong to the same coalition in π O PT . The purpose of test T 2 is to determine the
identities of P1 and P2. This goal is achieved indirectly by a process of determining, one by
one, each one of those players who are guaranteed to be neither P1 nor P2 and eliminating
them from consideration.
123
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Table 7 Tests for eliminating
possibilities for the two top
priority players; i and j are any
two distinct players
Test Comparison
T 1 v(πG) ? v(π S)
T 2(i, j) v((N − {i}, {i})) ? v((N − { j}, { j}))
Theorem 8 and Lemma 11 are a formalization of the eliminations that result from the
outcomes of T 1, and the deductions they entail. Theorem 9 and Lemmas 12 to 16 are a
formalization of the eliminations that result from T 2, and the deductions they entail.
In what follows, E will denote the set of those elements of Z that get eliminated as the
result of a test. Z1 ⊂ Z (Z1 ⊂ Z ) will denote the set of possibilities before (after) the test
T 1. Z2 ⊂ Z (Z2 ⊂ Z ) will denote the set of possibilities before (after) the test T 2(i, j).
Theorem 8 The test T 1 defined in Table 7 will result in the following eliminations:
E =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
{(x, y, 1, 1) | (x, y, 1, 1) ∈ Z} if v(πG) < v(π S).
{(x, y, 1, 2) | (x, y, 1, 2) ∈ Z} if v(πG) > v(π S).
Z if v(πG) = v(π S).
Proof The test T 1 compares v(πG) (the value of the coaliiton structure comprised of
the single grand coalition) and v(π S) (the value of the coalition structure comprised
of all singleton coalitions) and must result in one of the following three outcomes:
v(πG) ? v(π S)
<
E = {(x, y, 1, 1) | (x, y, 1, 1) ∈ Z}
=
E = Z
>
E = {(x, y, 1, 2) | (y, x, 1, 2) ∈ Z}
1. v(πG) < v(π S) : Consider the implication X1 defined in Table 6 and suppose π1 = πG
and π2 = π S . If v(πG) < v(π S), then for any two distinct players i and j , the antecedant
of R⇒ will be true while its consequent will be false. This means that the consequent of
L⇒ will be false, so, by contrapositive, its antecedant must be false. In other words,
(i, j, 1, 1) and ( j, i, 1, 1) are both impossible options for the two top priority players.
So both (i, j, 1, 1) and ( j, i, 1, 1) must be eliminated from Z . Since (i, j, 1, 1) and
( j, i, 1, 1) are a pair, elements are eliminated in pairs.
2. v(πG) > v(π S) : Consider the implication X2 defined in Table 6 and suppose π1 = πG
and π2 = π S . If v(πG) > v(π S), then for any two distinct players i and j , the antecedant
of R⇒ will be true while its consequent will be false. This means that the consequent of L⇒
will be false, so, by contrapositive, its antecedant must be false. In other words, (i, j, 1, 2)
and ( j, i, 1, 2) are both impossible options for the two top priority players. So (i, j, 1, 2)
and ( j, i, 1, 2) must both be eliminated from Z . Since (i, j, 1, 2) and ( j, i, 1, 2) are a
pair, elements are eliminated in pairs.
3. v(πG) = v(π S) : Combining the above arguments for the two cases v(πG) < v(π S) and
v(πG) > v(π S), (i, j, 1, 1), ( j, i, 1, 1), (i, j, 1, 2), and ( j, i, 1, 2) must all be eliminated
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from Z leaving Z empty. As we will prove in Lemma 15, an empty Z marks a violation
of monotonicity. unionsq
Lemma 11 For the test T 1:
1. If v(πG) < v(π S), then all the assertions in first column of Table 8 will be valid.
2. If v(πG) > v(π S), then all the assertions in second column of Table 8 will be valid.
3. If v(πG) = v(π S), then Z1 = {}6
Proof The assertions in the first three rows of Table 8 follow readily from Theorem 8.
As per Lemma 10, every element in Z has a unique partner in Z , and is the partner of
a unique element in Z . Then, as per Theorem 8, T 1 only eliminates elements in pairs. The
assertions in the last two rows of Table 8 follow. unionsq
It should now be evident that the test T 1 is useful for determining whether or not the
two top priority players belong to the same coalition in π O PT . If v(πG) < v(π S), then P1
and P2 belong to different coalitions in π O PT . On the other hand, if v(πG) > v(π S), then
P1 ∈ C O PT1 and P2 ∈ C O PT1 . However, the identities of P1 and P2 are still unknown. The
test T 2 is for finding P1 and P2. T 2 follows T 1. Further, T 2 is conducted repeatedly until the
condition for termination (defined below) is satisfied. The following is a high-level overview
of the whole process:
1. First, conduct T 1 with Z1 = Z .
2. Then, repeat T 2(i, j) by suitably varying i and j until the condition for
termination is satisfied.
Theorem 9 and Lemmas 12 to 16 are a formalization of the eliminations that result from
T 2.
Theorem 9 Suppose that π1 = (N − {i}, {i}) and π2 = (N − { j}, { j}) for any two distinct
players i and j . The test T 2 defined in Table 7 will result in the following eliminations:
E =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
S1 ∪ S2 if v(π1) < v(π2)
S3 ∪ S4 if v(π1) > v(π2)
S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 ∪ S4 if v(π1) = v(π2)
where S1, S2, S3, and S4 are defined as follows.
S1 = {(i, u, 1, 2) | u = i, u = j} ∪ {(u, i, 1, 2) | u = i, u = j}
S2 = {( j, u, 1, 1) | u = i, u = j} ∪ {(u, j, 1, 1) | u = i, u = j}
S3 = {(i, u, 1, 1) | u = i, u = j} ∪ {(u, i, 1, 1) | u = i, u = j}
S4 = {( j, u, 1, 2) | u = i, u = j} ∪ {(u, j, 1, 2) | u = i, u = j}
6 In Lemma 15, we prove that an empty Z marks a violation of monotonicity.
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Proof The test T 2 compares v((N −{i}, {i})) and v(({N − j}, { j})), so it must result in one
of the following three outcomes.
v((N − {i}, {i})) ? v((N − { j}, { j}))
<
E = S1 ∪ S2
=
E = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 ∪ S4
>
E = S3 ∪ S4
1. If v((N − {i}, {i})) < v((N − { j}, { j})), then for every (u, j, 1, 1) where u = i and
u = j , the antecedant of R⇒ in X1 (see Table 6) is true while the consequent is false.
This means that the consequent of L⇒ will be false, and by contrapositive, its antecedant
must be false. So (u, j, 1, 1) must be eliminated from Z . Likewise, ( j, u, 1, 1) must also
be eliminated. Observe that elements are eliminated in pairs. Then, for every (u, i, 1, 2)
where u = i and u = j , the antecedant of R⇒ in X2 (see Table 6) is true while the
consequent is false. By contrapositive, the antecedant of L⇒ in X2 must be false. Thus
(u, i, 1, 2) must be eliminated from Z . Likewise, (i, u, 1, 2) must also be eliminated.
Again, elements are eliminated in pairs.
2. If v((N − {i}, {i})) > v((N − { j}, { j})), then for every (u, j, 1, 2) where u = i and
u = j , the antecedant of R⇒ in X2 is true while the consequent is false. By contrapositive,
the antecedant of L⇒ in X2 must be false. (u, j, 1, 2) must be eliminated from Z . Likewise,
( j, u, 1, 2) must also be eliminated. Here too elements are eliminated in pairs. Then, for
every (u, i, 1, 1) where u = i and u = j , the antecedant of R⇒ in X1 is true while its
consequent is false. By contrapositive, the antecedant of L⇒ in X1 must be false. Thus
(u, i, 1, 1) must be eliminated from Z . Likewise, (i, u, 1, 1) must also be eliminated.
Note again that elements are eliminated in pairs.
3. If v((N − {i}, {i})) = v((N − { j}, { j})), then combine the arguments made above for
v((N − {i}, {i})) < v((N − { j}, { j})) and v((N − {i}, {i})) > v((N − { j}, { j})) to get
E = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 ∪ S4. Here again that elements are eliminated in pairs.
unionsq
Lemma 12 establishes the relation between the sets Z2 (i.e., the possibilities before T 2) and
Z2 (i.e., the possibilities after T 2).
Lemma 12 Suppose every element in Z2 has a unique partner in Z2, and every element in
Z2 is the partner of a unique element in Z2. Then, regardless of the outcome of T 2, every
element in Z2 must have a unique partner in Z2, and every element in Z2 must be the partner
of a unique element in Z2.
We are given that every element in Z2 has a unique partner in Z2, and every element in
Z2 is the partner of a unique element in Z2. Now, the eliminations that result from T 2 are
defined in Theorem 9 in terms of the sets S1, S2, S3, and S4. The very definition of these four
sets entails the following assertion:
For 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, each element in Si has a unique partner in Si , and is the partner of a
unique element in Si .
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It follows that, regardless of the outcome of T 2, every element in Z2 must have a unique
partner in Z2, and every element in Z2 must be the partner of a unique element in Z2.
It should now be evident that by varying i and j , T 2(i, j) can be used for eliminations. In
Lemma 13, we prove that T 2 can be used for eliminations as long as the set of possibilities
for the two top priority players contains at least two partner pairs.
Lemma 13 If the set of possibilities for the two top priority players contains at least two
partner pairs, T 2 can be guaranteed to result in eliminations.
Proof As per Definition 7, there are two possible forms for a partner pair, so any two pairs
must be in one of the following forms.
–
(
(i, x, 1, 1), (x, i, 1, 1)
)
,
(
( j, x, 1, 1), (x, j, 1, 1)) where i = j .
–
(
(i, x, 1, 2), (x, i, 1, 2)
)
,
(
( j, x, 1, 2), (x, j, 1, 2)) where i = j .
–
(
(i, x, 1, 1), (x, i, 1, 1)
)
,
(
( j, x, 1, 2), (x, j, 1, 2)) where i = j .
For any i ∈ N and j ∈ N − {i}, consider any x ∈ N such that x = i and x = j .
Suppose Z2 contains the pairs ((i, x, 1, 1), (x, i, 1, 1)) and (( j, x, 1, 1), (x, j, 1, 1)). As per
Theorem 9, if the outcome of T 2(i, j) is v(π1) ≤ v(π2) where π1 = (N − {i}, {i}) and
π2 = (N −{ j}, { j}), then the pair (( j, x, 1, 1), (x, j, 1, 1)) must be eliminated. On the other
hand, if the outcome of T 2(i, j) is v(π1) ≥ v(π2), then the pair ((i, x, 1, 1), (x, i, 1, 1))
must be eliminated. Regardless of the outcome of T 2(i, j), eliminations are guaranteed.
Next, suppose Z2 contains ((i, x, 1, 2), (x, i, 1, 2)) and (( j, x, 1, 2), (x, j, 1, 2)). As per
Theorem 9, if the outcome of T 2(i, j) is v(π1) ≤ v(π2) where π1 = (N − {i}, {i}) and
π2 = (N −{ j}, { j}), then the pair ((i, x, 1, 2), (x, i, 1, 2)) must be eliminated. On the other
hand, if the outcome of T 2(i, j) is v(π1) ≥ v(π2), then the pair (( j, x, 1, 2), (x, j, 1, 2))
must be eliminated. Regardless of the outcome of T 2(i, j), eliminations are guaranteed.
Consider the last case where Z2 contains the pairs ((i, x, 1, 1), (x, i, 1, 1)) and
(( j, x, 1, 2), (x, j, 1, 2)). However, as per Lemma 12, such a situation can never arise since
T 1 is done before T 2. At the end of T 1, it will be known whether the two top priority players
belong to the same or to different coalitions in π O PT . unionsq
Lemma 14 If the set of possibilities for the two top priority players contains only one partner
pair, then T 2 cannot be guaranteed to result in eliminations.
Proof As per Theorem 9, the only eliminations possible from T 2(i, j) for any i ∈ N and
j ∈ N − {i} are S1, S2, S3, and S4. We are given that the set of possibilities for the two top
priority players, Z2, contains only one partner pair. From the definition of partner pair (see
Definition 7) and the definitions of the sets S1, S2, S3, and S4 (see Theorem 9), it is evident
that Z2 can be a subset of only one of the four sets S1, S2, S3, and S4. For elimination to
occur, Z2 must be a subset of one of the four sets S1, S2, S3, and S4.
As per Definition 7, a partner pair must be of the form ((x, y, 1, 1), (y, x, 1, 1)) or
((x, y, 1, 2), (y, x, 1, 2)) where x ∈ N and y ∈ N −{i}. Suppose the pair in Z2 is of the form
((x, y, 1, 1), (y, x, 1, 1)). Now, neither (x, y, 1, 1) nor (y, x, 1, 1) can belong to S1 or S4.
(x, y, 1, 1) and (y, x, 1, 1) must both belong to S2 or both to S3. For the former case, elimi-
nation is possible only if v(π1) ≤ v(π2) where π1 = (N −{i}, {i}) and π2 = (N −{ j}, { j})
but not if v(π1) > v(π2). For the latter, elimination is possible only if v(π1) ≥ v(π2) but
not if v(π1) < v(π2). In other words, elimination may or may not happen depending on
the outcome of T 2. Thus, T 2(i, j) is not guaranteed to result in eliminations if the set of
possibilities for the two top priority players contains only the pair ((x, y, 1, 1), (y, x, 1, 1)).
By the same argument, T 2(i, j) is not guaranteed to result in eliminations if the pair in
Z2 is of the form ((x, y, 1, 2), (y, x, 1, 2)). unionsq
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At this stage, we know from Lemma 13 those conditions under which T 2 is guaranteed
to result in eliminations, and from Lemma 14, those conditions under which T 2 is not
guaranteed to result in eliminations. This raises the question ‘can T 2 result in the elimination
of all possibilities so that Z2 = {}?’. As we prove in Lemma 15, the elimination of all
possibilities implies a violation of monotonicity.
Lemma 15 After eliminations from T 2, if the set of possibilities that remain is empty, then
monotonicity is violated.
Proof The optimal structure is known to be unique and values monotonic. The basis of all the
eliminations that result from T 1 and T 2 are the monotonicity induced implications X1 and
X2 given in Table 6. Thus, if the set of possibilities that remain after eliminations becomes
empty, monotonicity must have been violated.
We are now going to prove in Lemma 16 that T 2, if done after T 1, will reveal certain
facts about the two top priority players.
Lemma 16 For arbitrary i ∈ N and j ∈ N − {i}, the outcome of T 2(i, j) will reveal the
following facts:
1. (P1 = i) ⇒ (P2 = j) ∧ (P2 = i) ⇒ (P1 = j) if v(π1) ≤ v(π2)
2. (P1 = j) ⇒ (P2 = i) ∧ (P2 = j) ⇒ (P1 = i) if v(π1) ≥ v(π2)
where π1 = (N − {i}, {i}) and π2 = (N − { j}, { j}).
Proof Recall that T 1 is done before any run of T 2. As per Lemma 11, after T 1, Z1 must be
in one of the following two forms:
1. Z1 = {(x, y, 1, 2)|(x, y, 1, 2) ∈ Z}: If the outcome of T 2(i, j) is v(π1) ≤ v(π2) then,
as per Theorem 9, we have the following.
Z2 = Z2 − (S1 ∪ S2)
= Z1 − (S1 ∪ S2) (32)
with the sets S1 and S2 as defined therein. Since S2  Z1, we get
Z2 = Z1 − S1
= {(x, y, 1, 2)|(x, y, 1, 2) ∈ Z} −
({(i, u, 1, 2) | u = i, u = j} ∪ {(u, i, 1, 2) | u = i, u = j})
This clearly means that, if i is one of the two top priority players, the other one must be
j . This is the first implication given in the statement of this Lemma.
On the other hand, if the outcome of T 2(i, j) is v(π1) ≥ v(π2) then, as per Theorem 9,
we have the following.
Z2 = Z2 − (S3 ∪ S4)
= Z1 − (S3 ∪ S4) (33)
with the sets S3 and S4 as defined therein. Since S3  Z1, we get
Z2 = Z1 − S4
= {(x, y, 1, 2)|(x, y, 1, 2) ∈ Z} −
({( j, u, 1, 2) | u = i, u = j} ∪ {(u, j, 1, 2) | u = i, u = j})
This clearly means that, if j is one of the two top priority players, the other one must be
i . This is the second implication given in the statement of this Lemma.
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2. Z1 = {(x, y, 1, 1)|(x, y, 1, 1) ∈ Z}: If the outcome of T 2(i, j) is v(π1) ≤ v(π2) then,
as per Theorem 9, we have the following.
Z2 = Z2 − (S1 ∪ S2)
= Z1 − (S1 ∪ S2) (34)
with the sets S1 and S2 as defined therein. Since S1  Z1, we get
Z2 = Z1 − S2
= {(x, y, 1, 1)|(x, y, 1, 1) ∈ Z} −
({( j, u, 1, 1) | u = i, u = j} ∪ {(u, j, 1, 1) | u = i, u = j})
This clearly means that, if j is one of the two top priority players, the other one must be
i . This is the second implication given in the statement of this Lemma.
On the other hand, if the outcome of T 2(i, j) is v(π1) ≥ v(π2) then, as per Theorem 9,
we have the following.
Z2 = Z2 − (S3 ∪ S4)
= Z1 − (S3 ∪ S4) (35)
with the sets S3 and S4 as defined therein. Since S4  Z1, we get
Z2 = Z1 − S3
= {(x, y, 1, 1)|(x, y, 1, 1) ∈ Z} −
({(i, u, 1, 1) | u = i, u = j} ∪ {(u, i, 1, 1) | u = i, u = j})
This clearly means that, if i is one of the two top priority players, the other one must be
j . This is the first implication given in the statement of this Lemma.
unionsq
As per Lemma 13, T 2 is useful for doing eliminations as long as the set of possibilities
contains at least two partner pairs. Thus, by repeating T 2(i, j) with suitably varying i and
j , all those players who are guaranteed to be neither P1 nor P2 can be eliminated from
consideration. The way to set i and j for doing T 2(i, j) is in the proof of Lemma 13. The
condition for termination is in Lemma 14: stop doing T 2 when the set of possibilities contains
only one partner pair.
Observe that prior to doing T 1, the set of all possibilities, Z , contains 2 × n × (n − 1)
elements. After T 1, the set of possibilities is reduced to n × (n − 1). When the termination
condition (viz., fewer than two remaining partner pairs) for T 2 is satisfied, the number of
possibilities is reduced to two. Further, these two remaining possibilities form a partner pair.
This is the end of Step 1 of our method for computing π O PT . At this stage, we know exactly
the two players who comprise the set P1 ∪ P2 although we do not know which one of these
two players is P1 and which one is P2. However, knowledge about the identities of P1 and
P2 is unnecessary as long as we know the precise two element set comprised of P1 and P2.
The entire process for Step 1 is given in Algorithm 4.
Analysing the time complexity of Algorithm 4, Lines 1 and 2 take O(n2) time. Line 3
takes constant time. Lines 4 takes O(n2) time. Lines 5 to 7 take constant time. Lines 10, 11,
and 12 take O(n2), O(1) and O(n2) time respectively. Since Z2 initially contains n × (n −1)
elements, the while loop of Line 9 will take O(n4) time. Given this, the if statement of Line 8
will take O(n4) time. Similarly, the if statement of Line 20 will take O(n4) time. The running
time of Algorithm 4 will therefore be O(n4).
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Algorithm 4 Algorithm for finding the two top priority players and whether or not they
belong the same coalition in π O PT .
1: Z ← {(i, j, 1, x) | i ∈ N , j ∈ N − {i}, x ∈ {1, 2}}
2: Initialise Z1 to Z .
3: Initialise Z1, Z2, and Z2 to empty sets.
4: Perform the test T 1 and update Z1 as per Theorem 8.
5: if v(πG) = v(π S) then Stop {Monotonicity violated}
6: end if
7: Z2 ← Z1
8: if v(πG) < v(π S) then {P1 and P2 belong to different coalitions in π O PT }
9: while |Z2| ≥ 4 do
10: Choose from Z2 any two pairs of the form ((i, x, 1, 2), (x, i, 1, 2)) and
(( j, x, 1, 2), (x, j, 1, 2)) such that i = j
11: Perform test T 2(i, j)
12: Z2 ← Z2 − E {Update as per Theorem 9}
13: end while
14: Z2 ← Z2 {Z2 now contains only one partner pair}
15: Suppose Z2 = {(x, y, 1, 2), (y, x, 1, 2)} for some x ∈ N and y ∈ N − {x} {Either x
is P1 and y is P2 or vice versa}
16: C O PT1 ← {x}
17: C O PT2 ← {y}
18: A ← 2
19: end if
20: if v(πG) > v(π S) then {P1 and P2 both belong to C O PT1 in π O PT }
21: while |Z2| ≥ 4 do
22: Choose from Z2 any two pairs of the form ((i, x, 1, 1), (x, i, 1, 1)) and
(( j, x, 1, 1), (x, j, 1, 1)) such that i = j
23: Perform test T 2(i, j)
24: Z2 ← Z2 − E {Update as per Theorem 9}
25: end while
26: Z2 ← Z2 {Z2 now contains only one partner pair}
27: Suppose Z2 = {(x, y, 1, 1), (y, x, 1, 1)} for some x ∈ N and y ∈ N − {x} {Either x
is P1 and y is P2 or vice versa}
28: C O PT1 ← {x, y}
29: A ← 1
30: end if
Next, we will show how to determine the identities of the players P3, . . . , Pn and their
respective optimal coalitions. This is Step 2 of our method. At the end of this step, π O PT
will have been computed.
In more detail, the identities of P3, . . . , Pn will be found one by one, starting with P3.
In general, Pi will be determined on the basis of the identities of P1, . . . , Pi−1 and their
respective optimal coalitions.
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Table 9 Monotonicity induced implication
Label Implication
Xa,b (Pi+1 = a ∧ a ∈ C O PTb )
L⇒ (∀π1, π2 (βx∈S
π1 = βx∈Sπ2 = βx∈Sπ O PT ) ∧ (βaπ1 = b) ∧ (βaπ2 = b)
R⇒ v(π1) > v(π2) )
Table 10 The test T 3(i, j, k, l)
π1 π2 T 3(a, b, c, d)
(βx∈S
π1
= βx∈S
π O PT
) (βx∈S
π2
= βx∈S
π O PT
) v(π1) ? v(π2)
(βa
π1
= b) (βc
π2
= d)
(βc
π1
= d) (βa
π2
= b)
Let S denote the set of top i priority players P1, . . . , Pi whose identities are known.
Suppose that each one of these i players belongs to one of the coalitions C O PT1 , . . . , C
O PT
A ,
at least one of them belongs to C O PTA , and none of them belongs to C
O PT
A+1 . Let R = N − S be
the set of remaining players. Then, the player with priority Pi+1 must be in R and must belong
to one of the coalitions C O PT1 , . . . , C
O PT
A+1 in π O PT . There are |R| = n − i possibilities for
the identity of Pi+1 and A+1 possibilities for its optimal coalition. Let V be a set containing
all these possibilities:
V = {(x, y)|x ∈ R, y ∈ {1, . . . , A + 1}}
The semantics of (x, y) is that x is a possible identity of the i + 1th priority player and x
belongs to C O PTy in π O PT . Thus |V | = (n − i) × (A + 1).
Due to unique optimum, only one element of V will correspond to π O PT and the problem
is find it. Suppose that this element is (a, b). Then, monotonicity induces the implication Xa,b
given in Table 9. That is, any structure π1 in which each player in S is in its optimal coalition
(i.e., βx∈S
π1
= βx∈S
π O PT
), player a is in C1b (i.e., βaπ1 = b) must have a higher value than any any
structure π2 in which each player in S is in its optimal coalition (i.e., βx∈S
π2
= βx∈S
π O PT
) and
player a is not in in C2b (i.e., βaπ2 = b). Given this implication, we will use the test T 3 (see
Table 10) to determine the identity of Pi+1 and its optimal coalition, by eliminating those
elements from V that do not correspond to π O PT .
The test T 3 takes four parameters a, b, c, and d such that (a, b) and (c, d) are two distinct
elements in V , and compares the values of two structures π1 and π2 defined as follows.
π1 is any structure in which each player in S is in its respective optimal coalition (i.e.,
βx∈S
π1
= βx∈S
π O PT
), player a is in C1b (i.e., βaπ1 = b), and player c is in any coalition except
C1d (i.e., βcπ1 = d). π2 is any structure in which each player in S is in its respective optimal
coalition (i.e., βx∈S
π2
= βx∈S
π O PT
), player c is in C2d (i.e., βcπ2 = d), and player a is in any
coalition except C2b (i.e., βaπ2 = b). Theorem 10 is a formalization of the eliminations that
result from the outcome of T 3(a, b, c, d). As before, E will denote the set of eliminations.
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Theorem 10 Suppose (a, b) and (c, d) are any two distinct elements of V . Depending on the
result of T 3(a, b, c, d), where T 3 is as defined in Table 10, one or both of these elements
will be eliminated from V .
Proof The outcome of T 3(a, b, c, d) must be one of the three possibilities: v(π1) < v(π2),
v(π1) = v(π2), or v(π1) > v(π2). If v(π1) ≤ v(π2), then (a, b) must be eliminated from
V . This is because the antecedant of the implication R⇒ of Xa,b in Table 9 is true but its
consequent is false. This means that the consequent of the implication L⇒ is false, so by
contrapositive, its antecedant must be false.
v(π1) ? v(π2)
<
E = {(a, b)}
=
E = {(a, b), (c, d)}
>
E = {(c, d)}
Analogously, if the result of T 3(a, b, c, d) yields v(π1) ≥ v(π2), then (c, d) must be
eliminated. unionsq
Lemma 17 If |V | ≥ 2, T 3 can be guaranteed to result in one or more eliminations.
Proof As per Theorem 10, for any two distinct elements (a, b) and (c, d) of V , the test
T 3(a, b, c, d) will result in at least one elimination. unionsq
Lemma 18 If the eliminations from T 3 result in an empty V , monotonicity is violated.
Proof The basis of eliminations from T 3 is the monotonicity induced implication of Table 9.
Thus, if any elimination results in an empty V , monotonicity was violated. unionsq
By appropriately varying the parameters a b, c, and d , the test T 3(a, b, c, d) can be used
to determine the identity of Pi+1 and its optimal coalition. Lemma 19 is a constructive proof
of how this can be done.
Lemma 19 Suppose the identities and optimal coalitions for the i (i ≥ 2) top priority players
P1, . . . , Pi are known. To determine the identity of Pi+1 and its optimal coalition, the test
T 3 must be performed at most (n − i) × (A + 1) − 1 times with appropriate parameters.
Proof As per Theorem 10, for any two distinct elements (a, b) and (c, d) of V , the test
T 3(a, b, c, d) will result in at least one elimination. Since |V | = (n − i)× (A + 1), T 3 must
be performed at most (n − i) × (A + 1) − 1 times. unionsq
Based on Theorem 10 and Lemmas 17 to 19, Pi+1 and its optimal coalition can be deter-
mined as follows.
Step 1 Choose any two elements from V , say (a, b) ∈ V and (c, d) ∈ V .
Step 2 Perform the test T 3(a, b, c, d).
Step 3 As per Theorem 10, any one or both of the following possibilities will be elimi-
nated. Let E be the set of eliminations.
Step 4 Update V to V − E .
Step 5 Repeat Steps 1 to 4 until V has more than one element.
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Algorithm 5 Algorithm for computing the identities of P3, . . . , Pn and their respective
optimal coalitions.
1: for i ← 3, n − 1 do
2: R ← N − {P1, . . . , Pi }
3: V ← {(x, y) | x ∈ R, y ∈ {1, . . . , A + 1}}
4: while |V | > 2 do
5: Choose any two elements from V , say (a, b) ∈ V and (c, d) ∈ V .
6: Perform T 3(a, b, c, d) and let E be the set of eliminations where E is as defined
in Theorem 10.
7: V ← V − E
8: end while
9: Pi+1 ← a {where V = {(a, b)}}
10: C O PTb ← C O PTb ∪ a
11: if b = A + 1 then
12: A ← A + 1
13: end if
14: end for
15: Pn ← a {where a ∈ N and a /∈ {P1, . . . , Pn−1}}
16: b ← arg max
t
v(π t ) {where the structure π t for 1 ≤ t ≤ A + 1 is defined as follows:
for each x ∈ {P1, . . . , Pn−1}, βxπ i = βxπ O PT and βaπ i = t}
17: C O PTb ← C O PTb ∪ a
After these steps, the only element left in V will be the pair whose first element is the identity
of Pi+1 and whose second element is its optimal coalition. By varying i + 1 between 3 and
n−1, P3, . . . , Pn−1 and their respective optimal coalitions are found. Then the lowest priority
player Pn will be the only remaining player, i.e., Pn = a where a ∈ N and a /∈ {P1, . . . , Pn−1}
and its optimal coalition will be C O PTb where
b = arg max
t
v(π t ).
The structure π t for 1 ≤ t ≤ A + 1 is defined as follows: for each x ∈ {P1, . . . , Pn−1},
βx
π i
= βx
π O PT
and βa
π i
= t .
The above greedy method is formulated in Algorithm 5. Analysing its time complexity,
Line 2 takes O(n) time while Line 3 O(n2) time. Lines 5 and 6 take constant time. Since
|V | ≤ (n − i) × (A + 1), the while loop of Line 4 will take O(n2) time. The Lines 9 to 13
take constant time. The for loop of Line 1 therefore will take O(n3) time. The Lines 15 to
17 take O(n) time. The time to run Algorithm 5 will be O(n3).
The total time taken to compute the optimal structure π O PT will therefore be O(n4) which
is the sum of the times taken by Algorithms 4 and 5.
Section 7.2 is an illustration of this method for three player games.
7.2 An illustration for three-player games
Step 1 is to determine the two top priority players and their optimal coalitions. Figure 4 is
a decision tree for Step 1. The non-leaf nodes of the tree are the tests. For each test, the
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Fig. 4 A decision tree for determining the two top priority players for three-player games. The non-leaf nodes
of the tree indicate tests, the grey boxes are the eliminations and the green boxes are the remaining possibilities
(Color figure online)
resulting eliminations are shown in the grey boxes. Each leaf node is shown as a green box
containing the two remaining possibilities. Initially, Z contains all twelve possibilities:
Z = {(1, 2, 1, 1), (2, 1, 1, 1), (1, 3, 1, 1), (3, 1, 1, 1), (2, 3, 1, 1), (3, 2, 1, 1), (1, 2, 1, 2),
(2, 1, 1, 2), (1, 3, 1, 2), (3, 1, 1, 2), (2, 3, 1, 2), (3, 2, 1, 2)}.
The first test, T 1, shown in the root node compares the values of the structure containing
the grand coalition and the one comprised of all singletons. If v(πG) < v(π S), then as per
Theorem 9, the resulting eliminations will be
E = {(1, 2, 1, 1), (2, 1, 1, 1), (1, 3, 1, 1), (3, 1, 1, 1), (2, 3, 1, 1), (3, 2, 1, 1)}
This is shown along the left branch of the root node in Fig. 4. On the other hand, if v(πG) >
v(π S), then the resulting eliminations will be
E = {(1, 2, 1, 2), (2, 1, 1, 2), (1, 3, 1, 2), (3, 1, 1, 2), (2, 3, 1, 2), (3, 2, 1, 2)}.
This is shown along the right branch of the root node in Fig. 4. Along the middle branch,
v(πG) = v(π S) and this is a violation of monotonicity.
At level 1 of the tree along the left branch, is the test T 2(3, 2) which compares the
values v(({1, 2}{3})) and v(({1, 3}{2})). The eliminations that result from the three different
outcomes of this test are shown in the grey boxes. For v(({1, 2}{3})) < v(({1, 3}{2})), four
possibilities remain after this elimination: (1, 2, 1, 2), (2, 1, 1, 2), (3, 2, 1, 2), and (2, 3, 1, 2).
These four elements are of the form (i, x, 1, 2), (x, i, 1, 2), ( j, x, 1, 2), and (x, j, 1, 2) where
x = 2, i = 1, and j = 3. Thus, as per the proof of Lemma 13, the next test will be T 2(1, 3)
which compares the values v(({1}{2, 3})) and v(({1, 2}{3})). This is shown along the leftmost
branch of the tree. For the case v(({1}{2, 3})) < v(({1, 2}{3})), the two top priority players
123
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
are known to be the players 2 and 3 and they are known to belong to different coalitions in
π O PT . The remainder of the tree is constructed similarly. This is Step 1.
Step 2 is to determine the optimal coalition for the player with priority P3. Since it is
a three player game, the identity of P3 will become known at the end of Step 1. Suppose
that, at the end of Step 1, Z = {(1, 2, 1, 2), (2, 1, 1, 2)}. Then there are three possibilities
for P3’s optimal coalition: C O PT1 , C
O PT
2 , and C
O PT
3 . Define the structures π1, π2, π3 as
follows: π1 = ({1, 3}, {2}), π2 = ({1}, {2, 3}) and π3 = ({1}, {2}, {3}). Player 3 must belong
to C O PT1 if max(v(π1), v(π2), v(π3)) = v(π1), to C
O PT
2 if max(v(π1), v(π2), v(π3)) =
v(π2), and to to C O PT3 if max(v(π1), v(π2), v(π3)) = v(π3).
8 Applications
Many applications of cooperative games arise in combinatorial optimization problems [5,
9,14]. As demonstrated in Tables 3 and 4, the metric introduced in Sect. 2 is useful for
defining monotonicity for a wide variety of cooperative games. CFGs and PFGs provide a
general prototype for modelling a number of combinatorial optimization problems. Our work
preserves this generality by introducing the abstract notions of distance and monotonicity to
capture application specific details. Likewise, qmin is also an abstract entity and its precise
definition is application dependent. The remainder of this section gives a detailed account of
the relevance of the monotonicity requirement and the meaning of qmin for three potential
applications: machine-scheduling games, supply-chain games, and combinatorial auctions.
The proposed methods are useful for such applications if an ordering over the players is
known to exist but the ordering itself is unknown.
Machine-scheduling games: In a typical job shop scheduling problem [6,25], there is a set
of non-identical jobs and a set of different machines. Each job
must be allocated to a single machine but a machine may be
allocated several jobs. There are temporal constraints on jobs,
in that some jobs must be completed before certain other jobs
can be started. The machines run in parallel but the jobs on
a machine a run sequentially. The completion time of a job
depends on the job and the machine it is run on. The objective
is to assign jobs to machines such that the time to complete the
jobs is minimised. Such a scheduling problem is analogous to
a PFG because a job can be viewed as a player and a machine
as a coalition of its assigned jobs. There must be cooperation
and coordination within coalitions in that the jobs assigned to a
machine must be ordered to optimise completion times taking
into consideration the set up times needed to switch from one
job to another. Externalities arise because the completion times
of the jobs on a machine affect the start times of jobs on other
machines. The objective function of a scheduling problem is
analogous to the value function in a coalition game. Although
such scheduling problems are generally computationally hard,
they are easy under the monontonicity assumption. Suppose
we know that any delay in the completion of certain jobs will
cause delays in other jobs. More precisely, for any i (where
1 ≤ i < n) any delay in the completion job i will have knock
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on effects that cause delays in the subsequent jobs i +1, . . . , n,
such that the value of any structure in which players 1 to i agree
with the optimum has a higher value than any coalition structure
in which only the players 1 to i − 1 agree with the optimum.
In other words, there is a known ordering on all the n jobs. The
monotonicity condition applies to such a scenario. However,
suppose that such an ordering is known only for the first few
jobs 1, . . . , qmin of the sequence but not for the remaining jobs
qmin+1, . . . , n. This is precisely the quasi-monotonicity condi-
tion. Finally, for those situations where the ordering of players
is unknown, the method proposed in Sect. 7 is useful.
Supply-chain games: Business applications of multiagent systems frequently require
automated formation of supply chains [12,24]. In many such
settings, externalities play a significant role [15]. For example,
Aerogistics7 provided a platform for small and medium-size
manufacturers of aircraft components to form on-line supply-
chain coalitions so that they were able to bid for manufacturing
projects that were too large for them individually. The externali-
ties in this setting arose from the fact that all aircraft components
had to ultimately conform to the same standards. Consequently,
the cost of standardization procedures incurred by any coali-
tion depended on the number and structure of other winning
coalitions. Given these externalities, the aim is to form a supply-
chain to minimize the cumulative cost of the projects. In such
a scenario, some components are more crucial to the effective
operation of an aircraft than others. For example, an aircraft
engine matters more than any other component such as aircraft
seats. Thus an engine manufacturer must be given the highest
priority in the sense of being in the right coalition. Monotonicity
is satisfied when all players (i.e., manufacturers) can be pri-
oritized from high to low; the value of a coalition structure
is then decreasing in its distance from the optimum. Quasi-
monotonicity arises when only the players 1, . . . , qmin can be
prioritized. Further, for those situations where the priorities are
unknown, the method proposed in Sect. 7 is useful.
Combinatorial auctions: In distributed problem solving, a manager auctioning out tasks
to bidders aims to optimise some performance measure such as
the total cost incurred or the task completion times [38]. A task
is allocated to a single bidder but a bidder may be allocated sev-
eral tasks. Externalities arise due to temporal inter-dependence
between tasks. Such a scenario is analogous to the machine-
scheduling games described above with tasks being akin to jobs
and bidders to machines.
A number of further applications such as economic lot sizing, timetabling in sports
and transportation, and workforce scheduling [25] fit the general framework of machine-
scheduling games given above. For such applications, the proposed methods compute an
7 A British company located in Liverpool—see www.aerogistics.com for details.
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optimal coalition structure on the basis of an ordering on the structures; their numeric values
are not required.
8.1 Pros and cons of the distancemetric
In the games described above, there is an ordering over the players and misplacing a high
priority player is more detrimental than misplacing multiple lower priority players. The metric
proposed in Sect. 3.1 is well suited to such games but not to those in which mis-placing a
high priority player may have the same effect as mis-placing several lower priority players or
even to those games in which there is no player ordering. When there is no player ordering,
similarity between two structures could be given just in terms of the number of mis-placed
players. One such measure is the minimum number of players that must be deleted from
the structures to make them equal. This alternative measure function, call it dALT , could be
defined as follows in terms of the contraction of a coalition structure.
Definition 8 The contraction of a structure π = {C1, C2, . . .} to a coalition S ⊆ N is defined
as
πS = (C1 − S, C2 − S, . . .).
The distance between any two structures is then
dALT (π1, π2) = min{|S| : π1S = π2S}.
Theorem 11 is proof that dALT is a mteric.
Theorem 11 The distance function dALT satisfies all metric axioms.
Proof Non-negativity is satisfied because dALT (π1, π2) ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. Further, for any
two structures, π1 and π2, d(π1, π2) = 0 implies that π1 = π2 and π1 = π2 implies
d(π1, π2) = 0. Symmetry is trivially satisfied. To prove triangle inequality, consider three
distinct arbitrary structures π1, π2, and π3 with distances as shown in Fig. 1. The triangle
inequality axiom requires d1 ≤ d2 + d3. Let S1 be the smallest coalition to which π1 and π2
must be contracted to make them equal. Let S2 be the smallest coalition to which π2 and π3
must be contracted to make them equal. Let S3 be the smallest coalition to which π1 and π3
must be contracted to make them equal. Then we have the following:
dALT (π1, π3) = |S3|
π1S3 = π3S3 (36)
π1S4 = π3S4 where S4 = S2 ∪ S3
dALT (π2, π3) = |S2|
π2S2 = π3S2
π2S4 = π3S4 (37)
π1S4 = π2S4 f rom (36) and (37)
dALT (π1, π2) ≤ |S4| f rom (38)
≤ |S2| + |S3|
≤ dALT (π1, π3) + dALT (π2, π3) (38)
unionsq
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Example 9 is an illustration of the measurement of distances using dALT .
Example 9 Consider the following structures:
π1 = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}, {6, 7}}
π2 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}, {6, 7}}
π3 = {{1, 2, 3, 7}, {4, 5}, {6}}
π1 and π2 can be made equal just by deleting player 3 from both structures. So, the distance
between π1 and π2 will be dALT (π1, π2) = 1. In the same way, the distance between π1
and π3 will be dALT (π1, π3) = 1.
Consider the metric d of Sect. 3, in the context of Example 9. This metric gives
d(π1, π2) = 1/2 while d(π1, π3) = 1/6. The structure π3 is closer to π1 than is π2
because the mis-placed player 7 has a much lower priority than the mis-placed player 3.
In contrast, as per dALT , π1 is equidistant from π2 and π3 because this metric considers
only the number of mis-placed players but is insensitive to the priorities of the mis-placed
players. In order to cater to games with unordered players, monotonicity would need to be
defined in the context of dALT and corresponding methods devised for computing optimal
structures. Note that dALT is not the only metric for sets, other metrics could be defined and
that optimality is metric related and not absolute.
9 Related work
Although the complete set partitioning problem has been studied for over four decades [18–
20], work on optimal partitioning in the context of PFGs has only just begun [44]. The
following is a chronological summary of the progress made in the context of CFGs and
PFGs.
Rothkopf et al. [32] studied the complete set partitioning problem in the context of combi-
natorial auctions. This work is similar to our research in that it focuses not on the entire search
space but only on a restricted part of it in order to gain computational feasibility. However,
there are a number of crucial differences. First, they considered only the complete set parti-
tioning problem (i.e., CFGs) and for this particular problem, they devised computationally
feasible solutions for a restricted part of the search space. In contrast, we consider not just the
complete set partitioning problem but any kind of value function (i.e., non-separable, CFGs,
and PFGs with positive only, negative only, and positive and negative externalities) that is
quasi-monotonic. The second difference is in terms of the approaches: [32] restrict the size
of search space by imposing constraints on the cardinality of coalitions and partitions to gain
computational feasibility, while we allow all partitions but restrict to quasi-monotonic value
functions.
In order to overcome the complexity of complete set partitioning, some methods for
generating approximate solutions were developed. Shehory and Kraus [37] presented anytime
greedy approximation method for the set partitioning and set covering problems in the context
of task allocation in multiagent systems. Their approach to reduce computational complexity
was to impose a restriction on the number of agents per coalition. The solution thus generated
is guaranteed to be within a loose ratio bound from the optimum given the restriction on the
number of agents. Later, Sandholm et al. [34] used a breadth first search (BFS) method for
finding an approximate solution that guarantees that the solution is within a tight bound from
optimum.
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Sen and Dutta [35] employed genetic algorithms to approximately solve the complete
set partitioning problem and empirically showed that their method outperforms a number of
exact solution methods in many settings. This heuristic approach does not provide guarantees
on the quality of the approximation.
In the context of winner determination in combinatorial auctions, Sandholm [33] presented
an iterative deepening A∗ (I D A∗) heuristic method with an admissible heuristic for solving
the complete set partitioning problem in exponential time.
Rahwan and Jennings [26] proposed a faster and more memory efficient version of the
dynamic programming method employed in [32] for the set partitioning problem. Again for
CFGs, Rahwan et al. [29] used branch and bound and, through simulations, showed that
pruning of the search space can be better accomplished by representing the search space in
a certain way. Empirical evaluations showed that the solution can be generated faster than
some of the other methods. Rahwan et al. [27,28] also conducted one of the few studies
of coalition structure generation for PFGs. However, they focused on PFGs with restricted
externalities allowing positive only or negative only but not mixed externalities. This method
has exponential time complexity.
Keinanen showed how simulated annealing can be used to generate an optimal coalition
structure [17] for CFGs. They analyzed its performance in terms of various neighborhood
operators. This being a heuristic approach, there is no guarantee on the quality of approxi-
mation.
For CFGs, Michalak et al. [23] showed how a branch and bound search can be improved
by decentralising it whilst ensuring minimum inter-agent communication.
Ueda et al. [41] focused on CFGs and proposed an approximation method by assuming
that the characteristic function is given as the optimal solution of a distributed constraint
optimization problem. The approximate solution was shown to be within a constant factor of
the optimal solution.
Di Mauro et al. [21] presented a greedy heuristic method for coalition structure generation
for CFGs without giving any guarantee on the quality of approximation.
Banerjee and Kraemer [3] dealt with coalition structure generation for PFGs by defining
agent types and assuming that externalities occur on the basis of types. Using a branch and
bound method they empirically investigated the number of pruned partitions.
In a spirit similar to ours, but focusing only on CFGs, Bachrach et al. [2] proved polyno-
mial time solvability by restricting the search space in a graph representation with bounded
tree width. Aziz and de Keijzer [1] developed a polynomial time algorithm by imposing
restrictions such as a fixed number on player types in CFGs and a fixed number of weights in
weighted voting games. Ueda et al. [42] proposed a concise representation for characteristic
functions in a similar vein to synergy coalition group representation [8] and MC-nets [16]
but more compact than them.
Service and Adams [36] gave a constant factor approximation scheme for coalition struc-
ture generation for CFGs. Using dynamic programming they showed how their method could
be used as an anytime algorithm.
Recently, Michalak et al. [22] conducted an extensive analysis of the search space for
CFGs and showed that by combining dynamic programming with a tree search, it is possible
to improve the search relative to methods using only dynamic programming or only tree
search.
Table 11 provides a chronological summary of the developments that occurred over the
last four decades. Compared to the methods listed above, the proposed approach is distinctive
in that for the first time we show how a distance metric can be used for solving the optimal
coalition structure determination problem. Another unique feature of the proposed methods
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is that they are suitable for any kind of monotonic value function, i.e., non-separable, CFGs,
and PFGs with positive only, negative only, and mixed externalities. Existing literature has
considered PFGs with positive only externalities, or else negative only externalities [28].
Mixed externalities were considered in [3] but only for one specific value function. Besides,
our search methods require only an ordering on the values of partitions to be known but not
their actual values. In contrast, the methods in the literature require the actual value of each
coalition to be known, and assume that the value function is separable in that the value of
each partition is simply the sum of the values of the coalitions in it. It remains unclear how
to know these values, especially for large games.
10 Conclusions
This paper investigated the problem of computing an optimal coalition structure. For coalition
games with an ordering over the players, a distance metric was introduced to measure the
distance between any pair of coalition structures. For monotonic value functions and a known
player ordering, a polynomial time greedy method was devised for searching for an optimal
structure. It was shown how the method could be used for quasi-monotonic functions. Another
polynomial time method was devised to compute the optimal coalition structure for a setting
in which the value function is monotonic and an ordering over the players is known to exist
but the ordering itself is unknown.
There are various avenues for further research. This paper focussed on coalition games
with an ordering over the players. In many coalition games, players are unordered. How the
proposed methods can be extended to such games remains to be investigated. With regard to
the analysed setting for multiple optima, the optima themselves are close to each other. More
general settings where the optima are far apart need further investigation. For such general
settings, an optimum may not be computable in polynomial time and methods for computing
approximately optimal structures would be needed.
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